Judicial Review of Allegedly Ultra Vires Actions of the Veterans\u27 Administration: Does 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) Preclude Review by Van Dolsen, Stephen
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 55 Issue 4 Article 5 
1987 
Judicial Review of Allegedly Ultra Vires Actions of the Veterans' 
Administration: Does 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) Preclude Review 
Stephen Van Dolsen 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stephen Van Dolsen, Judicial Review of Allegedly Ultra Vires Actions of the Veterans' Administration: 
Does 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) Preclude Review, 55 Fordham L. Rev. 579 (1987). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol55/iss4/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ALLEGEDLY ULTRA VIRES ACTIONS
OF THE VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION: DOES 38
U.S.C. § 211(a) PRECLUDE REVIEW?
INTRODUCTION
In his second inaugural address, Abraham Lincoln challenged the Na-
tion "to care for him who shall have borne the battle and for his widow
and his orphan."1 Since the beginning of the Nation, in one form or
another, Americans have provided benefits for veterans.2 Today Lin-
coln's charge has become a huge undertaking: for in fiscal year 1985 the
Veterans' Administration (VA) spent over 26 billion dollars on a vast
system of veterans' programs.3 While few would argue with the principle
that the American people owe something more than gratitude to their
servicemen and -women, there are occasional debates on just how large a
debt the Nation should feel obligated to pay. A current subject of dis-
pute among traditional participants in these debates deals less with the
size of the debt than with the amount of due process owed veterans in
repaying it.
This current controversy swarms around the modem versions of two
old statutes that many feel to be the vestiges of an archaic tradition. This
tradition holds that government benefits are mere gratuities and not
"rights," and thus the government enjoys great latitude in disbursing
them.4 One statute prohibits a lawyer from charging a veteran more
1. Second Inaugural Address of President Abraham Lincoln (Mar. 4, 1865), re-
printed in 6 A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, 276,
277 (1897). These words have since become the motto of the Veterans' Administration.
See 1985 V.A. Ann. Rep. at xi.
2. Massachusetts colony implemented the first American veterans' program in 1636
providing benefits for those maimed in service against the Pequot Indians. Some of the
other colonies followed suit. See 1985 V.A. Ann. Rep. at xi. In 1776 the Continental
Congress passed a bill providing disability pensions for veterans of the Continental Army.
See id; 5 Journals of the Continental Congress 702, 702-04 (1906). The First Congress
later consolidated all pension programs under the federal government in 1789. See Act of
Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 24, 1 Stat. 95 (expired 1790); 1985 V.A. Ann. Rep. at xi. The veterans
benefit program would grow over the next century and beyond, and by the 1920's veter-
ans' programs were inefficiently administered by several different agencies. Id. at xii.
Congress began consolidating the programs in the 1920's by creating the Veterans' Bu-
reau. See Act of August 9, 1921, ch. 57, tit. I, 42 Stat. 147, 147-52, repealed by World
War Veterans' Act, 1924, ch. 320, § 601, 43 Stat. 607, 629-30; World War Veterans' Act,
1924, ch. 320, tit. I, 43 Stat. 607, 607-15, modified by Act of July 3, 1930, ch. 863, § 7, 46
Stat. 1016, 1018. Congress completed consolidation by establishing the Veterans' Ad-
ministration in 1930. 1985 V.A. Ann. Rep. at xii; see Act of July 3, 1930, ch. 863, 46 Stat.
1016, repealed by Veterans' Benefits Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-56, § 2202(125), 71 Stat.
83, 167. See generally, Veterans' Legislation, H.R. Doc. No. 136, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-
61 (1945) (synopsis of veterans' legislation enacted prior to 1933).
3. See 1985 V.A. Ann. Rep. at xvii. The VA provides pension benefits, educational
assistance, special assistance to disabled veterans, burial benefits and cemetery operations,
guaranteed and insured loans, life insurance and medical care including hospital, nursing
home and outpatient care. See generally id. at 9-112. The veteran population of the
United States numbered nearly 28 million as of Sept. 30, 1985. See id. at 2.
4. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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than ten dollars to process a veteran's claim.' The second statute, which
is the subject of this Note, precludes review in the federal courts of most
VA benefit determinations.'
Traditionally, much of the veterans' benefit system has been beyond
the reach of the federal courts. A continuous chain of statutes has barred
the courts from reviewing most decisions involving benefits claims.' Un-
til the 1950's, these laws were followed almost without fail.' Since that
time, however, some courts have been devoting increasing energy to cir-
cumventing the preclusion statute and reviewing VA benefit determina-
tions.9 Among the variety of judicially created exceptions to the statute
is one permitting review of VA actions that are said to be beyond the
Veterans' Administrator's statutory authority, despite plain statutory
language that precludes such review.10 This Note examines the decisions
5. See 38 U.S.C. § 3404(c)(2) (1982). An agent or attorney who violates this provi-
sion is subject to a maximum of two years imprisonment, or a 500 dollar fine, or both.
See 38 U.S.C. § 3405 (1982).
6. See 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982).
7. See infra notes 89-112 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 587 (1934) (dictum); Prado Del
Castillo v. United States, 272 F.2d 326, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1959) (VA Administrator action
not reviewable), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 966 (1960); De Sinlao v. United States, 271 F.2d
846, 848 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (per curiam) (same), overruled, 379 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
Magnus v. United States, 234 F.2d 673, 674-75 (7th Cir. 1956) (same); Brasier v. United
States, 223 F.2d 762, 765-66 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 913 (1955); Slocumb
v. Gray, 179 F.2d 31, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (same); Van Home v. Hines, 122 F.2d 207, 209
(D.C. Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 689 (1941), overruled, 379 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir.
1967); United States v. Mroch, 88 F.2d 888, 890 (6th Cir. 1937) (same); Fletcher v. VA,
103 F. Supp. 654, 655-56 (E.D. Mich. 1952) (same).
9. In a line of cases between 1958 and 1967 the Courts of Appeals for the District of
Columbia created an exception to § 211(a) that permitted review of all VA benefit deter-
minations except the initial processing of an application for benefits. See infra notes 107-
110 and accompanying text. Congress later overruled this exception through an amend-
ment to § 211 (a). See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
In Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974), the Supreme Court held that § 211(n)
does not bar review of the constitutionality of a veterans' benefits statute challenged by a
veteran denied VA benefits. See infra notes 112-127 and accompanying text. Several
courts have used the reasoning in Robison to find permissible other types of review of VA
action. See, e.g., American Federation of Government Employees v. Nimmo, 711 F.2d
28, 31 (4th Cir. 1983) (§ 211(a) does not bar review of the constitutionality of Adminis-
trator's actions); Devine v. Cleland, 616 F.2d 1080, 1083-85 (9th Cir. 1980) (Robison
permits review of VA procedures on grounds that the procedures are unconstitutional due
to failure of Congress to provide due process protection by statute); Moore v. Johnson,
582 F.2d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1978) (same); Beauchesne v. Nimmo, 562 F. Supp. 250, 254
(D. Conn. 1983) (§ 211 (a) does not bar review of the constitutionality of Administrator's
actions); Arnolds v. VA, 507 F. Supp. 128, 130-31 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (same); Falter v. VA,
502 F. Supp. 1178, 1180-81 (D.N.J. 1980) (same); Dumas v. Cleland, 486 F. Supp. 149,
151-52 (D. Vt. 1980) (same); Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 440 F. Supp. 806, 808-09
(E.D. Mich. 1977) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 590 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1978); Plato v.
Roudebush, 397 F. Supp. 1295, 1302-04 (D. Md. 1975) (same). Some courts have permit-
ted challenges to the Administrator's actions alleged to have been ultra vires. See infra
notes 137-154 and accompanying text.
10. See American Federation of Government Employees v. Nimmo, 711 F.2d 28, 31
(4th Cir. 1983) (section 211 (a) does not bar review of VA authority to promulgate regula-
tions); Evergreen State College v. Cleland, 621 F.2d 1002, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 1980) (same);
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creating and those rejecting this exception. It argues that rejecting the
exeception correctly construes the preclusion statute. Part I of this Note
discusses the presumption in American administrative law that agency
actions are reviewable. Part II surveys the history of the VA preclusion
statute and analyzes the major Supreme Court decision interpreting it.
Part III reviews the decisions granting and those rejecting federal court
review of VA actions alleged to be beyond statutory authority. Finally,
Part IV examines those decisions and argues that the exception should
not in fact exist.
I. PRESUMPTION OF THE EXISTENCE OF A RIGHT
TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. General Presumption
As a result of both judicial and legislative action, there is a strong
presumption favoring the availability of judicial review in American ad-
ministrative law.' The presumption was originally created by the courts
interpreting the common law.12 Congress later enacted the presumption
University of Md. v. Cleland, 621 F.2d 98, 100-01 (4th Cir. 1980) (same); Merged Area X
(Educ.) v. Cleland, 604 F.2d 1075, 1077-78 (8th Cir. 1979) (same); Wayne State Univ. v.
Cleland, 590 F.2d 627, 631 (6th Cir. 1978) (same); Beauchesne v. Nimmo, 562 F. Supp.
250, 254 (D. Conn. 1983) (same); Arnolds v. VA, 507 F. Supp. 128, 130-31 (N.D. I!1.
1981) (same).
11. See Administrative Procedure Act, § 702, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. III 1985) ("A
person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved
by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof."). See also Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104 (1977) ("[The APA] undoubt-
edly evinces Congress' intention and understanding that judicial review should be widely
available to challenge the actions of federal administrative officials."); Dunlop v. Bachow-
ski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975) ("[Tlhe Secretary... bears the heavy burden of overcoming
the strong presumption that Congress did not mean to prohibit all judicial review of his
decision."); City of Chicago v. United States, 396 U.S. 162, 164 (1969) ("[W]e start with
the presumption that aggrieved persons may obtain review of administrative decisions
unless there is 'persuasive reason to believe' that Congress had no such purpose.") (quot-
ing Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967)); Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) ("[J]udicial review of a final agency action by an
aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such
was the purpose of Congress."); Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 581-82 (1958) (per
curiam) ("Generally, judicial relief is available to one who has been injured by an act of a
government official which is in excess of his express or implied powers."); Brownell v.
Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 185 (1956) (exceptions from the APA not lightly to be
presumed and expanded mode of review granted by the Act not to be modified); Marcello
v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955) (exemptions from APA "not lightly to be presumed");
Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 232 (1953) (APA to be construed as providing ex-
panded judicial review); see also 5 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 28:1 (2d ed.
1984) at 253-57; Note, Congressional Preclusion of Judicial Review of Federal Benefit Dis-
bursement. Reasserting Separation of Powers, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 778, 778 & nn. 1-2 (1984)
[hereinafter Separation of Powers].
12. Under the common law of the 19th century discretionary government action was
generally held to be unreviewable. See, e-g., Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497,
516 (1840) (interference by courts into the ordinary duties of the executive departments
would cause "nothing but mischief" and no such power was given to the courts). In
Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827) the Court stated that
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as part of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 1 3 The legislative
history of the APA clearly indicates that the availability of judicial re-
view of administrative action is to be presumed. 4 The Supreme Court
established the modem version of the presumption in Abbott Laboratories
v. Gardner.'5 The Court, following the holdings of earlier cases and com-
bining their language with that of the legislative history of the APA,
stated that "only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a
contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial re-
view."' 6 To determine if a statute explicitly or impliedly precludes re-
view, a court examines its express language, legislative history, its
objectives, the nature of the administrative action said to be non-review-
able and the structure of the statutory scheme providing for such ac-
tion.17 Where a "substantial doubt" exists as to congressional intent, the
general presumption favoring judicial review controls.'"
It is well settled that Congress can narrow, and perhaps preclude, judi-
cial review. 9 The power to do so may depend upon the challenges facing
[w]henever a statute gives a discretionary power to any person, to be exercised
by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule of construction,
that the statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of
those facts.... It is no answer that such a power may be abused, for there is no
power which is not susceptible of abuse.
Id. at 31-32. The presumption of unreviewability became a presumption of reviewability
in 1902 in actions of government involving a clear mistake of law. American School of
Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 110 (1902) (courts have the power to grant
relief in cases involving actions unauthorized by law and in violation of rights of the
individual). The Supreme Court broadened the right to review generally to include ac-
tions alleged to be in excess of the agency's statutory authority. See Board of Governors
v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 444 (1947) (courts may review acts in excess of statutory author-
ity); Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1944) ("The responsibility of determining
the limits of statutory grants of authority [to administrative agencies] is a judicial func-
tion .... "); Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R., 305 U.S. 177, 185 (1938) (right to review
to determine if actions in excess of statutory authority); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223
U.S. 605, 621-22 (1912) (courts may review acts challenged as violations of property
rights and in excess of statutory authority). See generally 5 K. Davis, supra note 11,
§ 28:1, at 254-55 (discussing history of presumption of reviewability of administrative
action).
13. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982 & Supp. 1111985). The right to review appearing
in § 10(a) of the original act, see id. at 243, now appears at 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. III
1985). See supra note 11.
14. See H.R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946), quoted in Abbott Labo-
ratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 n.2 (1967); S. Doe. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
212, 275, quoted in Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 232 (1953).
15. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
16. Id. at 141 (quoting Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962)).
17. See Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984); see also South-
ern Ry. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S. 444, 454-63 (1979); Morris v. Gres-
sette, 432 U.S. 491, 499-507 (1977).
18. Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 351 (1984).
19. See F. Davis, Veterans'Benefits, Judicial Review, and the Constitutional Problems
of "Positive" Government, 39 Ind. L.J. 183, 189 (1964). Justice Brennan has stated that
[w]hen the legality of administrative action is at issue.... [p]ertinent statutory
language, legislative history, and public policy considerations must be examined
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the Nation,2" a balancing of the interests involved in the purportedly
non-reviewable agency action,21 and the type of review sought. The pre-
sumption in favor of reviewability is strongest for a claim that the agency
action in question is unconstitutional. 2 The presumption is weakest
to determine whether Congress precluded all judicial review, and, if not,
whether Congress nevertheless foreclosed review to the class to which the plain-
tiff belongs. Under the [APA], 'statutes [may] preclude judicial review' or
'agency action [may be] committed to agency discretion by law.' In either case,
the plaintiff is out of court ... because Congress has stripped the judiciary of
authority to review agency action.
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 173-74 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in result and
dissenting) (citation omitted); see also Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340,
345-46 (1984) (quoting Barlow, 397 U.S. at 173 (Brennan, J., concurring in result and
dissenting)); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156,
(1970) ("There is great contrariety among administrative agencies created by Congress as
respects 'the extent to which, and the procedures by which, different measures of control
afford judicial review of administrative action.'" (quoting Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S.
288, 312 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); City of Chicago v. United States, 396 U.S.
162, 164 (1969) ("[W]e start with the presumption that aggrieved persons may obtain
review of administrative decisions unless there is 'persuasive reason to believe' that Con-
gress had no such purpose."); Administrative Procedure Act, § 701, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)
(1982) ("This chapter applies... except to the extent that- (1) statutes preclude judicial
review."); cf. United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201, 206 (1982) (Medicare statute
specifically precluded review of certain Medicare claims); Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S.
491, 504-05 (1977) (Attorney General's failure to interpose timely objection under § 5 of
the Voting Rights Act not subject to review); Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404, 412 (1977)
(section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act precludes judicial review of decisions of Attorney
General and Director of the Census).
20. See, eg., Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404, 409-10 (1977) (necessity of combatting
continuing discrimination against voters requires "sterner" measures of Voting Rights
Act, including limitations on judicial review); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 308-10, 332-33 (1966) (same); Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333
U.S. 103, 111-14 (1948) (Presidential decision concerning awarding of overseas air routes
a political decision not subject to judicial review); Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114,
122-23 (1946) (review of decisions of draft boards final and unreviewable unless there is
no basis in fact for classification of registrant); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 427-
31, 441-43 (1944) (wartime emergency permits Congress to limit judicial review of price
regulations); F. Davis, supra note 19, at 189 ("That constitutional sanction for such limi-
tations on judicial review varies in accordance with the necessities of the times... has...
become increasingly clear." (footnote omitted)).
21. See Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345-53 (1984) (consumers
not able to obtain judicial review as their interests less important than those of dairy
handlers); United States v. Erika, 456 U.S. 201, 208-10 & n.13 (1982) (denial of judicial
review of certain benefits determinations under Medicare program because such benefits
were minor matters); Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404, 409-10 (1977) (minorities' rights to
vote outweigh states' interests in obtaining judicial review of certain decisions under Vot-
ing Rights Act); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308-17, 332-33 (1966)
(same); F. Davis, supra note 19, at 189 (limitations on judicial review vary with "the
relative importance of the interest for which protection is sought").
22. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977) (precluding review of constitu-
tional questions would be an "'extraordinary' step" requiring proof by "'clear and con-
vincing evidence " of congressional intent) (quoting Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361,
366-67 (1974)); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-67 (1974) (contention that a stat-
ute bars judicial review of constitutionality of veterans' benefits legislation raises ques-
tions as to the constitutionality of that statute); 5 K. Davis, supra note 11, § 28:3, at 259
(decisions about constitutionality have the strongest claim for reviewability); R. Pierce, S.
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where appellants seek review of fact findings.23 Between these extremes,
courts may find the right to review determinations of discretion, proce-
dure, law, and claims of arbitrariness.24 Finally, regardless of a preclu-
sion statute, courts almost certainly will review an action on grounds of
lack of jurisdiction, fraud and clear unconstitutionality. 25
What is not clear is exactly to what extent Congress may narrow the
scope of judicial review. The courts have been troubled by cases where
both explicit and implied limitations of judicial review have been found.26
Faced with an equivocal preclusion statute, some courts use the practi-
cal, if paradoxical, approach of deciding the case against the party seek-
Shapiro & P. Verkuil, Administrative Law and Process § 5.2, at 128-30 ("Despite the
dearth of case law on the issue, dicta in several cases and scholarly analysis suggest
strongly that there is a constitutional right to judicial review of constitutional issues
raised by agency actions." (footnotes omitted)).
23. See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 106 S. Ct. 2009, 2015-16 (1986) (court
must defer to agency's findings of fact if based on reasonable conclusion under statute
similar to APA, but questions of law are for courts to resolve); Citizens to Preserve Over-
ton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-14, 416 (1971) (review of facts under APA limited
to "certain narrow, specifically limited situations"); 5 K. Davis, supra note 11, § 28:3, at
259 (determination of factual issues have the weakest claim to reviewability); see also
Administrative Procedure Act, § 706, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982) (standards of review under
APA). Courts will use the "substantial evidence" test to review formal rulemaking and
adjudications under the APA and when required by agency organic acts. The arbitrary
and capricious test is used in informal rulemaking and informal adjudications. See gener-
ally R. Pierce, S. Schapiro & P. Verkuil, supra note 22, §§ 7.3, 7.3.1, 7.3.2, at 357-62
(standards of review of fact findings).
24. See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 106 S. Ct. 2009, 2016 (1986) (questions of
law for courts to decide); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-
14 (1971) (review of questions other than those of fact under APA); Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, § 706, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982) (standards of review under APA); 5 K. Davis,
supra note 11, § 28:3 at 259 (review of determinations of discretion, procedure, law and
arbitrariness).
25. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 839 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("It
may be presumed that Congress does not intend administrative agencies, agents of Con-
gress' own creation, to ignore clear jurisdictional, regulatory, statutory, or constitutional
commands .... ." Review of nonenforcement decision made pursuant to bribe not fore-
closed by nonreviewability presumption); 5 K. Davis, supra note 11, § 28:2 at 257-59.
26. Compare Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627, 631-32 (6th Cir. 1978) (38
U.S.C. § 211(a) does not preclude review of VA authority to promulgate regulations) with
Traynor v. Walters, 791 F.2d 226, 228-31 (2d Cir. 1986) (§ 21 l(a) precludes review of VA
authority to promulgate regulations), cert. granted sub nom. Traynor v. Turnage, 55
U.S.L.W. 3607 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1987) (No. 86-622); see also Daniel Int'l Corp. v. OSHRC,
656 F.2d 925, 932 (4th Cir. 1981) (APA "'does not require agency to publish in advance
every.., proposal which it may ultimately adopt as a rule,' "particularly when proposals
are adopted in response to comments in rulemaking proceeding) (quoting Spartan Radio-
casting Co. v. FCC, 619 F.2d 314, 321 (4th Cir. 1980)); Chrysler Corp. v. EPA, 600 F.2d
904, 908-09 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (§ 16(a) of Noise Control Act fails to provide jurisdiction
for court to review enforcement regulations promulgated pursuant to Act); United States
v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977) (agency should
disclose all scientific material that it believes supports proposed rule, to suppress mean-
ingful comment is to reject comment altogether); Verkuil, Congressional Limitations on
Judicial Review ofRules, 57 Tul. L. Rev. 733, 735 (1983) ("[E]xplicit and implied limita-
tion of review situations have troubled the courts deeply and as a result have produced
confused and often contradictory decisions.").
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ing review of agency action on the ground that this party would lose the
case on the merits even if it enjoyed a right to review.27 The court thus
avoids deciding the reach of the preclusion statute. Such judicial hedging
is symptomatic of uncertainty as to whether the Constitution requires
some form of judicial review of administrative action.
B. Does the Constitution Require Some Judicial Review of all
Administrative Action?
The constitutional objections to denial of judicial review of agency ac-
tion are found in the Article III judicial power,2" the doctrine of separa-
27. See, eg., Inland Empire Dist. Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 700 (1945) (unless
petitioners show NLRB acted unlawfully court should not decide question of reviewabil-
ity); Kirkhuffv. Nimmo, 683 F.2d 544, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (since district court must be
reversed appeals court need not determine whether statute permits review); Carter v.
Cleland, 643 F.2d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (under either possible exception to § 211(a) the
appellants would lose); 5 K. Davis, supra note 11, § 28:2, at 258-59, § 28:12, at 318-19
(discussing court's avoidance of issue of review in Kirkhuf).
28. See CFTC v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3256 (1986) ("[T]he constitutionality of a
given congressional delegation of adjudicative functions to a non-Article III body must be
assessed by reference to the purposes underlying the requirements of Article I.");
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods., 105 S. Ct. 3325, 3334 (1985) (discussing Article
III effects on judicial review of agency action); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Mara-
thon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70 n.23 (1982) (plurality opinion) ("[W]hen Congress
assigns these matters to administrative agencies, or to legislative courts, it has generally
provided, and we have suggested that it may be required to provide, for Art. I judicial
review."); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 367-68 (1974) (rejecting argument that
§ 211(a) prohibits Congress from considering constitutionality of veterans' benefits legis-
lation because such an interpretation is of questionable constitutionality); Verkuil, supra
note 26, at 736 (constititional sources of objections to denial of judicial review). Article
III of the Constitution provides that "[i]n all the other Cases before mentioned, the
supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." U.S. Const. art
III, § 2, cl. 2. Professor Hart believed that this clause must be read and interpreted such
that the "[e]xceptions" do not "destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the
constitutional plan." See Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1364-65 (1953). Professor Hart
believed that a necessary part of the constitutional scheme was the availability of a court
to decide claims of constitutional rights to judicial process and to provide such process if
the claim is sustained. See id., at 1363-72.
The ability of Congress to narrow the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and other
federal courts "[has] been the subject of vigorous academic debate for many years." Red-
ish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A
Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 Nw. U.L. Rev. 143, 143 (1982). See eg., Hart, supra;
Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 157 (1960); Redish & Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction
of Lower Federal Courts" A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. Pa. L Rev. 45
(1975). See generally C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts, § 10, at 32 n.l (4th ed. 1983)
(collecting law review articles). Although scholars generally view as plenary the power of
Congress over the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, many scholars also believe
that such power may not be exercised in violation of other provisions of the Constitution.
See id. § 10, at 35. Congress also has considerable control over the jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts. See generally, id. § 10 at 35-36 (discussing congressional control
over lower federal court jurisdiction).
19871
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
tion of powers29 and the fifth amendment due process clause.30 These
interrelate to provide a limit on Congress's power to restrict judicial re-
view. 3 ' Although the Supreme Court has never fixed the precise charac-
ter of this relationship, it recently has hinted that some minimum review
may be required even in the face of a preclusion statute. In Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,32 the Court distin-
guished between private rights33 and public rights.34 The latter, which
include VA benefits,35 require an action "between the Government and
persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the
constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments. '36
The Court noted that even where the management of public rights is
assigned by Congress to administrative agencies, providing some Article
III judicial review might be required.37
It is generally agreed that there is a right to review of unconstitutional
administrative action. 8 In Califano v. Sanders,39 the Supreme Court
29. See CFTC v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3256 (1986); Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agric. Prods., 105 S. Ct. 3325, 3335 (1985); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 63-64 (1982) (plurality opinion); United States v. Will, 449
U.S. 200, 217-18 (1980); Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 771 F.2d 480, 482 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
Verkuil, supra note 26, at 736; Note, Separation of Powers, supra note 11, at 785-96 (con-
stitutional source of objections to denial of judicial review).
30. See infra notes 48-70 and accompanying text; Verkuil, supra note 26, at 736.
31. Cf Hunt v. Local Bd. No. 197, 438 F.2d 1128, 1132-37 (3d Cir. 1971) (Gibbons,
J., concurring in result) (considering due process clause, separation of powers, and Arti-
cle III in determining right to review of Selective Service classification); see supra notes
28-30 and accompanying text; Verkuil, supra note 26, at 736.
32. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
33. Private rights are defined as involving "the liability of one individual to another
under the law as defined." Id. at 69-70 (plurality opinion) (quoting Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)). They are distinct from public rights, which at a minimum arise
"between the government and others." Id. at 69 (plurality opinion) (quoting Ex Parte
Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)). Private rights "lie at the core of the histori-
cally recognized judicial power" and are not removable from Article III courts. Id. at 70
(plurality opinion).
34. See id. at 67-70 & nn.22, 23 (plurality opinion). Public rights are often created by
statute. They have been described as involving such matters as "interstate and foreign
commerce, taxation, immigration, the public lands, public health, the facilities of the post
office, pensions and payments to veterans." Id. at 69 n.22 (plurality opinion) (quoting
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932); see also infra note 67.
35. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69
n.22 (1982) (plurality opinion) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)).
36. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932).
37. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69-70
n.23 (1982) (plurality opinion).
38. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69
n.23 (1982) (plurality opinion); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762 (1975) (statute's
preclusion of judicial review of constitutional questions permissible in part because other
avenues of review of constitutional questions available); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S.
361, 366-67 (1974) (interpretation of preclusion statute as barring review of constitutional
claims would be itself of questionable constitutionality); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v.
United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); R. Pierce, S. Schapiro &
P. Verkuil, supra note 22, § 5.2, at 129-30 (discussing right to judicial review of unconsti-
tutional administrative action). But see 5 K. Davis, supra note 11, § 28:3, at 264
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noted that constitutional questions were unsuited to resolution in admin-
istrative hearings, and that access to the courts was essential to their res-
olution.' Despite the strong indication that Article I review of
constitutional questions may be constitutionally required, however, the
Court in Sanders also suggested that "'clear and convincing evidence"'
of congressional intent may preclude such review."
On occasion, the Court has distinguished between cases in which the
government argues that constitutional challenges to agency action have
been precluded, and preclusion cases where no constitutional challenges
have been made.42 For example, the Court has protected its power to
review constitutional challenges by finding that Congress never intended
to bar review of constitutional claims.43 The Court has implied Con-
gress's acceptance of this dichotomy,' preserving the Court's role in the
constitutional plan.4" The Court's stance allows Congress flexibility in
shaping government priorities and avoids constitutional confrontations
over the power of Congress to limit the jurisdiction of Article M
courts.
46
("Whether a statute that bars judicial review of a substantial constitutional issue would
be constitutional has no clear answer in present law."). Professor Davis believes the un-
certainty has arisen following the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Erika, Inc.,
456 U.S. 201 (1982). See 5 K. Davis, supra, § 28:3, at 261-65. In Erika the Court held
that Congress had impliedly precluded judicial review of adverse benefit determinations
in Part B of the Medicare program. Erika, 456 U.S. at 206-11. Professor Davis found
significant the Court's holding that judicial review was impliedly precluded despite the
claim that administrative action had been unconstitutional. See 5 K. Davis, supra,
§ 28:3, at 264. Although the claim that the government's action had been unconstitu-
tional had not been argued in the appeal to the Supreme Court, see Erika, 456 U.S. at
205-06, it had been argued below. See Erika, Inc. v. United States, 634 F.2d 580, 591 (Ct.
Cl. 1980), rev'd, 456 U.S. 201 (1982). The Supreme Court, however, specifically avoided
the issue of whether there was a constitutional right to judicial review of the constitu-
tional claim because it had not been properly raised by Erika. See Erika, 456 U.S. at 211
n.14. Nevertheless, the Court had precluded review of a constitutional claim.
39. 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
40. See id. at 109.
41. See id. (quoting Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762 (1975)).
42. Compare Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-74 (1974) (Court interprets 38
U.S.C. § 21 l(a) as not barring review of claims that veterans' benefits statutes are uncon-
stitutional) with Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1977) (review precluded of
non-constitutional challenge to actions of Social Security Administration). See Verkuil,
supra note 26, at 737-38.
43. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-74 (1974) (Congress did not intend 38
U.S.C. § 211(a) to preclude review of claims that veterans' benefits statutes were uncon-
stitutional); Verkuil, supra note 26, at 737-39.
44. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 839 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("It
may be presumed that Congress does not intend administrative agencies, agents of Con-
gress' own creation, to ignore clear jurisdictional, regulatory, statutory, or constitutional
commands.. . ."); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762 (1975) (statutory preclusion of
review of constitutional claims acceptable as Congress has provided alternative avenues
of review); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-74 (1974) (preclusion statute inter-
preted as not intending to preclude review of claims that statute is unconstitutional);
Verkuil, supra note 26, at 737-39.
45. See Verkuil, supra note 26, at 737-39.
46. When constitutional review is not at stake the Court frequently is generous in
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Of particular interest in the case of government benefits is whether the
fifth amendment due process clause 47 requires some sort of judicial re-
view of agency action affecting benefits. The "new property cases"
48 of
the past two decades have suggested that the due process clause man-
dates minimum procedures for providing most government benefits,
49
and that these minimum procedures may include the availability of judi-
cial review.50 In any particular situation these minimum procedures are
determined by balancing of the government and private interests
involved."
In the past, there was considerable authority that grants of statutory
benefits were "gratuities" or "privileges" given by the state. As such, one
had no "right" to receive these benefits. They were beyond any proce-
dural or constitutional protection.52 Thus, a benefits program could be
finding that Congress has impledly precluded review. Cf. Block v. Community Nutrition
Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 346-53 (1984) (structure of statute implies preclusion of review of
milk marketing orders when sought by consumers); United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S.
201, 206-11 (1982) (implication that review of most determinations under Part B of
Medicare statute is precluded); Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 499-507 (1977) (impli-
cation that review of Attorney General's decision under § 5 of Voting Rights Act is pre-
cluded); Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 300-07 (1943)
(NLRB and courts have no jurisdiction to review mediation board's decision because
Congress wanted expedited procedure).
47. See U.S. Const. amend. V ("No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ....").
48. The term "new property" generally refers to the enormous wealth currently allo-
cated to eligible recipients by government that has become an important part of Ameri-
can life. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 10-9 -§ 10-13 (1978); Reich, The
New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733, 734-39 (1964) (defining new property); see, e.g., Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (social security benefits); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134 (1974) (federal nonprobationary employment); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971)
(driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits).
49. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (minimum due process re-
quired in administering Social Security benefits); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164-
67 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in part) (same, federal non-
probationary employment); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972)
("When protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is
paramount."); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (driver's licensee entitled to due
process protection); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-66 (1970) (welfare benefits enti-
tled to due process protection); L. Tribe, supra note 48, § 10-9, at 515; Separation of
Powers, supra note 11, at 779.
50. No court has yet reached this issue. See Note, Separation of Powers, supra note 11,
at 782 & n.32. However, the Court wrote in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70 n.23 (1982), that "when Congress assigns [public rights] to
administrative agencies, or to legislative courts, it has generally provided, and we have
suggested that it may be required to provide, for Art. III judicial review."
51. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Court balances three factors:
first, the private interest affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of the private interest through the current procedures and the probable value
of additional procedures; and third, the impact on government's interest of the additional
safeguards. See id. at 335; see also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167-68 (1974) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in part) (balancing of interests of
government and employee).
52. See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 577 (1934). In the context of veterans'
benefits, see, De Rodulfa v. United States, 461 F.2d 1240, 1257-58 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
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administered by the state without any judicial oversight. A corollary to
this doctrine was that the United States was not bound to provide a judi-
cial remedy to claims it had created against itself.53 It could refuse to
create any remedy, or it could create an exclusively administrative
remedy.5 4
In the 1970's, however, the Supreme Court began to undermine this
doctrine by viewing state created rights, including government benefits,
as property or liberty interests protected by the due process clause of the
fifth amendment."5 The Court took the position that operating benefits
programs involves state action because important rights are adjudi-
cated, 6 and because the discretion of bureaucrats administering such
programs is restricted by the statutes creating and controlling the pro-
grams.57 Because procedural due process exists to control the proper ap-
plication of a particular statute, state created rights are subject to the due
process clause. 8
nied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972); Milliken v. Gleason, 332 F.2d 122, 123 (lst Cir. 1964), cerL
denied, 379 U.S. 1002 (1965); Brasier v. United States, 223 F.2d 762, 765 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 913 (1955); Slocumb v. Gray, 179 F.2d 31, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Van
Home v. Hines, 122 F.2d 207, 209 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 689 (1941), over-
ruled on other grounds, 379 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See also Morris, Judicial Review
of Non-Reviewable Administrative Action: Veterans Administration Benefits Claims, 29
Admin. L. Rev. 65, 70 (1977); Separation of Powers, supra note 11, at 780-81.
53. See Dismuke v. United States, 297 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1936); Tutun v. United
States, 270 U.S. 568, 576-77 (1926); United States v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328, 331 (1919);
De Rodulfa v. United States, 461 F.2d 1240, 1258 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949
(1972); Milliken v. Gleason, 332 F.2d 122, 123 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1002
(1965); Slocumb v. Gray, 179 F.2d 31, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Van Home v. Hines, 122 F.2d
207, 209 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 314 U.S. 689 (1941), overruled on other grounds, 379
F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1967); see also Morris, supra note 52, at 70-72.
54. United States v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328, 331 (1919).
55. See cases cited supra at note 49; L. Tribe, supra note 48, § 10-9, at 514-22; Stew-
art, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1669, 1717-20
(1975); Separation of Powers, supra note 11, at 781.
56. See, eg., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) ("Suspension of issued licenses
thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees.");
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) ("[Termination of welfare benefits] involves
state action that adjudicates important rights.").
57. These statutes enact certain rules and understandings that create entitlement to
benefits, and applicants meeting the entitlement requirements possess a claim to the enti-
tlement and an expectancy that such a claim will be protected. This expectancy is similar
to that of the expectancy of traditional holders of property interests, which are protected
by the due process clause. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972); see
also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974) (state's establishment of prisoners'
good-time credit creates interest of prisoner protected by due process clause); Stewart &
Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1195, 1256 (1982) (due
process protection limited to constitutional liberty rights and property rights derived
from federal and state statutes and regulations, and property rights derived from state
common law); Separation of Powers, supra note 11, at 781 (noting that courts have or-
dered administrative process be augmented to comport with due process minimums).
58. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259-62 (1978) (procedural due process
rules "enabl[e] persons to contest the basis upon which a State proposes to deprive them
of protected interests."); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (required analy-
sis of state action to ensure it comports with procedural process); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
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Like the due process protection traditionally granted to property and
liberty interests, 59 the new property protections are designed to police the
exercise of governmental authority.' While the new property cases have
refined the distinction between "gratuities" and "rights,"', the scope of
new property protection has not matched that of traditionally protected
interests. In reviewing government actions concerning traditionally pro-
tected interests, the courts have had two concerns. The first is whether
the applicable administrative procedures have satisfied certain minimum
due process requirements.62 The second is whether the government ac-
tion meets the required substantive standards." Although the first con-
cern is part of the new property cases, 64 the second concern is not.65
Thus, while it is apparent that the recipients of government benefits are
entitled to some due process protection, this protection is less than that
accorded to the holders of traditional interests. The explanation for this
U.S. 67, 97 (1972) (minimum rights necessary to protect property). "The Supreme Court
has repeatedly asserted that the purpose of procedural protection is to ensure accurate
application of the relevant statute." Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 57, at 1255 n.258.
59. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170-72 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (general discussion concerning due process, which requires
fair procedure prior to depriving citizen of rights to liberty and property); Dent v. West
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1889) (due process secures the citizen against arbitrary
deprivation of life, liberty or property). Generally, fair hearings are required to deprive
persons of property. See McGrath, 341 U.S. at 165-66 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see
also Stewart, supra note 55, at 1718 (protection of property interests).
60. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976) (protection accorded
social security benefits); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (limitations on power to
revoke driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-71 (1970) (delineating re-
quirements for pretermination hearing regarding welfare benefits); cf. Meachum v. Fano,
427 U.S. 215, 226 (1976) (discussing liberty interest of prisoner undergoing transfer, in-
terest not implicated); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974) (due process pro-
tects liberty interests of prisoners undergoing disciplinary process).
61. In one opinion, the Supreme Court stated that it had "fully and finally rejected
the wooden distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges'." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 571 (1972). But see L. Tribe, supra note 47, § 10-9, at 515 n.4 (rights-gratuity
distinction "retained vitality.., where government carefully avoided creating any expec-
tion of receipt or renewal of interest upon the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of stated
conditions") (emphasis in original); Rabin, Preclusion of Judicial Review in the Processing
of Claimsfor Veterans'Benefits: A Preliminary Analysis, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 905, 910 & n.25
(1975) (rights-privileges dichotomy often appears in another guise).
62. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 165-66 &
n.10 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-86
(1908); see also Separation of Powers, supra note 11, at 781.
63. "In deciding whether the Congress, in enacting the statute under review, has ex-
ceeded the limits of its authority to prescribe procedure ... regard must be had, as in
other cases where constitutional limits are invoked, not to mere matters of form but to
the substance of what is required." Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 53 (1932); Separation
of Powers, supra note 11, at 781.
64. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970) (due process requires hear-
ing prior to termination of welfare benefits); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971)
(same, driver's license); see Stewart, supra note 55, at 1718-19; Separation of Powers,
supra note 11, at 781.
65. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 57, at 1258 n.269; Separation of Powers, supra
note 11, 781-82 & n.26.
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dichotomy may lie in the status of benefits as statutorily created rights
subject to the public rights doctrine.66
The public rights doctrine is derived from two sources. The first is the
principle of separation of powers. The second is the traditional distinc-
tion between matters exclusively determined by the political branches,
and those that are inherently judicial.67 Thus, Congress may create cer-
tain rights that exist in a form that the judiciary is capable of adjudicat-
ing.6" At the same time, however, the Court recognizes that at the very
least Congress has some say in the adjudication of those rights.69 Fi-
nally, because the operation of a benefits program requires some flexibil-
ity, the Court recognizes that the analogy between benefits and
traditional property "cannot be stretched to impose a constitutional limi-
tation on the power of Congress to make substantive changes" to the
public benefits laws.70
In sum, it is not certain whether the Constitution requires some mini-
mum judicial review, even in the face of a preclusion statute. It is cer-
tain, however, that constitutional challenges to agency action have the
strongest claim to a right to review. The Supreme Court seems to guard
its power to review constitutional claims, while granting Congress con-
siderable leeway to preclude review of the remaining claims. Finally, in
recent decades the Court has begun to require certain minimum due pro-
cess standards for adjudicating claims to government benefits. The im-
66. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
67. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67-68
(1982) (plurality opinion). "The doctrine extends only to matters arising 'between the
Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of
the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments,' and only to mat-
ters that historically could have been determined exclusively by those departments." Id.
(quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)).
68. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67
(1982) (plurality opinion) (citing Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co., 59
U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856)).
69. The interaction between the Legislative and Judicial Branches is at its height
where courts are adjudicating rights wholly of Congress' creation. Thus where
Congress creates a substantive right, pursuant to one of its broad powers to
make laws, Congress may have something to say about the proper manner of
adjudicating that right.
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 83 n.35 (1982)
(plurality opinion).
70. Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971); see De Rodulfa v. United States,
461 F.2d 1240, 1256 (D.C. Cir.) (quoting Richardson, 404 U.S. at 81), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 949 (1972); cf. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 589-90 (1979) (because Rail-
road Retirement benefits are noncontractual Congress can change these benefits at any
time without due process violation); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210 (1977) (plu-
rality opinion) (Social Security benefits classifications by Congress are entitled to defer-
ence as Congress is primarily responsible for making policy determinations). There is
also some authority to the effect that the legislative power to grant substantive rights
includes power to restrict procedures for vindicating those rights. See Arnett v. Ken-
nedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1974) (plurality opinion); Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New
Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 445,
460-70 (1977).
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pact of these rulings on the power of Congress to preclude review is also
in some doubt.
C. Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act
Congress codified the general presumption of the availability of review
of agency action in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).71 The sec-
tions pertaining to judicial review provide "a simplified statement ofjudi-
cial review designed to afford a remedy for every legal wrong."'72 Thus,
the APA entitles a person to judicial review if he or she has suffered a
legal wrong or has been adversely affected or aggrieved as a result of
agency action.73 The APA also sets the scope of review available to a
litigant, including a requirement that a reviewing court set aside agency
action that is unconstitutional, is in excess of statutory authority or with-
out observance of lawful procedure.74 The provisions granting review,
however, are not applicable if another statute precludes judicial review of
the agency action in question,75 or if such action is committed by law to
agency discretion.76
Since these provisions exempt review of actions made non-reviewable
by other statutes, the key issue to determine whether agency action is
reviewable is the existence and interpretation of such statutes. As the
Supreme Court has held in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner77 and its
progeny, a statute will be held to preclude review only after finding
"clear and convincing evidence" of congressional intent to so preclude. 78
The Court also has noted that it was the intent of Congress that the APA
cover a broad spectrum of administrative action,79 and that its "generous
review provisions" be given a hospitable interpretation. 80
The Court has not, however, used the Abbott Laboratories standard in
every subsequent case in which it has adjudicated claims of preclusion.
71. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
72. H.R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in, 1946 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 1195, 1205.
73. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. III 1985).
74. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
75. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a)(2), 702 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
76. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982). These provisions have led one commentator to
remark that the law of reviewability would be the same without the APA. "Because the
APA provision on reviewability is always dependent on other law, [see 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)
(1982)] the law of reviewability is essentially the same as it would be without any APA
provision." 5 K. Davis, supra note 11, § 28:1, at 256 (emphasis in original). Reviewabil-
ity without the APA would be based on the common law. See supra notes 11-12 and
accompanying text.
77. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
78. See Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 351 (1984); Dunlop v.
Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1974);
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971); Association of
Data Processing Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156-57 (1970); Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967).
79. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (footnote omitted).
80. See id. at 141.
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It has ignored the standard in some cases."1 The Court also is more
likely to find preclusion in cases involving areas of traditional legislative
or executive control, such as foreign relations,82 wartime emergencies
and military affairs, 3 and civil rights enforcement."
D. Summary
Despite the confusion as to the extent to which Congress can preclude
judicial review of agency action, there is a strong presumption favoring
review. The right to review will be found unless there is no substantial
doubt about congressional intent to preclude it. This right has been codi-
fied in the Administrative Procedure Act, and exists unless it has been
removed by a particular statute precluding review. In the case of veter-
ans' benefits, such a statute exists. The question thus becomes whether
this statute precludes review of particular Veterans' Administration ac-
tions. The question is further complicated by the changing constitutional
protections afforded the recipients of "new property" such as veterans'
benefits.
II. SECTION 211(A) AND PRECLUSION OF REVIEV OF VETERANS'
ADMINISTRATION DECISIONS
The statute precluding review of veterans' benefits determinations is
codified at 38 U.S.C. § 211(a). 5 It provides that
the decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under
any law administered by the Veterans' Administration providing bene-
fits for veterans and their dependents or survivors shall be final and
conclusive and no other official or any court of the United States shall
have power or jurisdiction to review any such decision by an action in
81. In these cases the Court engaged in a preclusion analysis without mentioning the
Abbott Laboratories standard. See, eg., Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 777-79 (1983)
(judicial review available after administrative process exhausted); United States v. Erika,
Inc., 456 U.S. 201, 206-08 (1982) (where statute specifies disputes in which review is
available, review of other disputes may be denied); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 764-
67 (1975) (review precluded); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 10-16 (1972) (same). See gen-
erally 5 K. Davis, supra note 11, § 28:11 (discussing Supreme Court use of clear and
convincing evidence standard).
82. See; e.g., Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111-14
(1948) ("[Ihe very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not
judicial.").
83. See eg., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1972) (Army establishment of civil-
ian surveillance unit); Orloffv. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-95 (1953) (denial of commis-
sion to draftee deemed security risk); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 165-66 (1948)
(deportation of enemy alien); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420, 437 (1944) (war-
time emergency).
84. See, eg., Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404, 409-10 (1977) ("Reading [the Voting
Rights Act] as completely precluding judicial review thus implements Congress' intention
to eradicate the blight of voting discrimination with all possible speed."); South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327-29 (1966) (discrimination against minority voters re-
quires sweeping remedies including preclusion of judicial review).
85. 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982).
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the nature of mandamus or otherwise.8 6
This approach of precluding review has been the policy of Congress since
it first waived sovereign immunity in the 19th century. 7
It is well settled that the United States cannot be sued without its con-
sent. s When Congress consented to suits against the government in ac-
tions not sounding in tort through the passage of the Tucker Act in
1887,89 it exempted pension claims,9 0 which at the time comprised virtu-
ally the entire veterans' program.91 The first law specifically addressing
preclusion in the context of veterans' benefits appeared in 1924.92 It
made all determinations of fact by the Veterans' Bureau involving most
veterans' programs conclusive. 93
The next preclusion statute appeared as part of the Economy Act of
1933. 91 A fiscal crisis created by the Depression led Congress to cut vet-
erans' benefits and grant the President and the Administrator complete
authority over administration of the programs designated in the Act.95
Section five of the Act precluded review of decisions of the Administrator
86. Id. The statute also specifically excludes from its provisions certain sections of
the veterans' benefits statutes. See id. These include: § 775, which grants jurisdiction to
the district courts of the United States in cases involving Servicemen's Group Life Insur-
ance, 38 U.S.C. § 775 (1982); § 784, which provides general provisions for suing the gov-
ernment over other life insurance programs, 38 U.S.C. § 784 (1982); and housing and
small business loan determinations, 38 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1851 (1982 & Supp. 111 1985).
87. See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
88. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980); Larson v. Domestic &
Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 688 (1949); Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 96 (1937);
C. Wright, supra note 28, § 22, at 115.
89. Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (current version in scattered sections of
28 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). Congress had begun to waive sovereign immunity in
1855, when it created the Court of Claims to hear money claims against the government
founded on Acts of Congress, executive regulations and express or implied contracts. See
Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (Little, Brown & Co. 1863 ed.) (current ver-
sion at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491-1509 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). Congress expanded this juris-
diction with the passage of the Tucker Act. See Tucker Act supra; see generally C.
Wright, supra note 28, § 22, at 115-16 (history of waiver of sovereign immunity).
90. See Tucker Act, § 1, 24 Stat. at 505.
91. See Dismuke v. United States, 297 U.S. 167, 170 (1936) ("The proviso withhold-
ing jurisdiction of suits on claims for pensions was a part of the original Tucker Act,
which became law ... at a time when the term 'pensions' commonly referred to the
gratuities paid by the government in recognition of past services in the Army or Navy.");
see also Veterans' Legislation, supra note 2, at 1-61.
92. See World War Veterans' Act, 1924, ch. 320, § 5, 43 Stat. 608, 609 (current ver-
sion at 38 U.S.C. §§ 210(c)(1), 211(a) (1982)).
93. See id.
94. Economy Act of 1933, ch. 3, § 5, 48 Stat. 8, 9 (current version at 38 U.S.C.
§ 211(a) (1982)).
95. See 77 Cong. Rec. 201 (1933) (statement of Rep. McDuffie) ("there is no quicker
way to restore the economic conditions of [the] country"); 77 Cong. Rec. 204 (1933)
(statement of Rep. Taber) ("the President may, by regulation, change the provisions of
compensations and pensions" and "may cut down these things"); 77 Cong. Rec. 254
(1933) (statement of Rep. Harrison) ("tragic happenings throughout this country which
call for [this] exceptional action"); see also F. Davis, supra note 19, at 188.
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made under the authority of the Act.96 Congress added an additional
preclusion statute to the veterans' benefits law in 1940.9' This second
statute was said to preclude review of any VA decision relating to any
claim under the veterans' benefits law.98 During the debates prior to pas-
sage of both the 1933 and 1940 acts, members of Congress agreed that
both laws merely continued or restated the law of non-reviewability then
in effect.99
The 1933 and 1940 statutes were repealed in 19 57i °° and replaced by a
single rewritten statute"°1 as part of a congressional effort to consolidate,
simplify and make more uniform the entire veterans' benefits law."°2
This statute was the first version of the section 211 (a) preclusion statute.
With the exception of some minor liberalizations of benefits, the Act was
said to continue the entire veterans' benefits law, presumably including
preclusion of review, then in effect.10 3 The process was completed the
following year when once again Title 38 was rewritten."° With the addi-
tion of one major and two minor amendments, 05 this became the mod-
em version of the preclusion statute.
96. See Economy Act of 1933, § 5, 48 Stat. at 9.
97. See Act of October 17, 1940, ch. 893, § 11, 54 Stat. 1193, 1197 (current version at
38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982)). The 1933 statute had been codified at 38 U.S.C. § 705, see
Wellman v. Whittier, 259 F.2d 163, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1958), and the 1940 statute was codi-
fied at 38 U.S.C. § lla-2. See Wellman, 259 F.2d at 168.
98. See S. Rep. No. 2198, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 11 (1940).
99. See 77 Cong. Rec. 254 (1933) (statement of Rep. Harrison) (1933 statute)
("[A]cting under those regulations and rates, whatever decision the Administrator shall
make shall be final."); 86 Cong. Rec. 13,383 (1940) (statement of Sen. George) (1940
statute) ("The amendment makes final the findings and adjudications of the Veterans'
Administrator"); 86 Cong. Rec. 13,491 (1940) (statements of Rep. Rogers) (1940 statute)
("[This bill] is desirable for the purpose of uniformity and to make clear what is believed
to be the intention of Congress that the various laws shall be uniformly administered in
accordance with the liberal policies [of] the Veterans' Administration.").
100. Veterans' Benefits Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-56, §§ 2202(128), (160), 71 Stat.
83, 167, 169. Thus, between 1940 and 1957 two VA preclusion statutes were in effect. See
F. Davis, supra note 19, at 186 n.12; U.S.C. Tables: Revised Titles Tables, Title 38, at 57-
59; U.S.C. Tables: Statutes at Large Table, at 310.
101. Veterans' Benefits Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-56, § 211(a), 71 Stat. 83, 92 (cur-
rent version at 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982)).
102. See H.R. Rep. No. 279, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1957 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 1214, 1215; S. Rep. No. 332, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. 1, reprinted in 1957
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1241, 1241.
103. See id.
104. Act of Sept. 2,1958, Pub. L. No. 85-857, 72 Stat. 1105. This Act was a continua-
tion of the process of consolidation and simplification of Title 38. See 104 Cong. Rec.
2250, 2253-54 (1958) (statements of Reps. Teague, Sisk) ("all the veterans' laws will be in
once place.. ."). The preclusion statute in this Act also appeared at 38 U.S.C. § 21 l(a).
See Act of Sept. 2, 1958, § 211(a), 72 Stat. at 1115.
105. In 1965 Congress established the Servicemen's Group Life Insurance Program,
which was made subject to judicial review as had been all previous VA insurance pro-
grams. See Act of Sept. 29, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-214, § 776(b), 79 Stat. 880, 886; H.R.
Rep. No. 1003, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-18, reprinted in 1965 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 3232-44. The following year Congress enacted the Vietnam Era G.I. Bill and made
determinations under it and all other educational programs unreviewable. See Veterans'
Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-358, § 4(h), 80 Stat. 12, 24; H.R. Rep.
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The major amendment to section 21 l(a) was enacted in 1970106 follow-
ing a series of decisions by the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia significantly narrowing the preclusion statute."°7 That court held
that because the term "claim" was defined by the VA to mean an initial
application for benefits, 0 the 1958 version of section 211(a), as
amended, precluded review of only the initial decision to grant or deny
benefits.'0 9 Thus, any subsequent action by the VA on the claim was
subject to judicial review. 110 Congress overruled these decisions by re-
moving the phrase "concerning a claim for benefits" from section
211 (a). "' Whether this action by Congress has greater significance than
merely overruling the D.C. Circuit is a subject of some controversy.
In Johnson v. Robison, I 2 the leading Supreme Court decision constru-
ing section 211(a), the Court viewed the 1970 amendment as an attempt
to restore vitality to what it called the two "primary purposes" of the
preclusion statute: to prevent veterans' benefits claims from burdening
the courts, the Veterans' Administration and the government with ex-
pensive and time-consuming litigation and to ensure the uniform and ad-
equate application of VA policy in light of the technical and complex
nature of the veterans' benefits program. "' The Administrator had ar-
ticulated these two purposes in a 1952 congressional hearing, 1 4 and the
No. 1258, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1966 U.S. Cong. Code & Admin. News
1888, 1900.
106. See Act of Aug. 12, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-376, § 8(a), 84 Stat. 787, 790.
107. See Tracy v. Gleason, 379 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Thompson v. Gleason, 317
F.2d 901 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Welman v. Whittier, 259 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
108. See Tracy v. Gleason, 379 F.2d 469, 472-73 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Wellman v. Whit-
tier, 259 F.2d 163, 168-69 & n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Both the 1940 and 1958 versions of the
preclusion statutes prohibited review of "any question of law or fact concerning a claim
for benefits or payments." Wellman, 259 F.2d at 168 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1 la-2) (em-
phasis in original); see supra notes 97 & 104.
109. See Tracy v. Gleason, 379 F.2d 469, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (adopting the Wellman
interpretation); Thompson v. Gleason, 317 F.2d 901, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The Wellman
case was decided under the old 1933 and 1940 preclusion statutes. The court held that the
1933 statute did not apply to Wellman because the section under which he forfeited his
benefits was not covered under the 1933 statute. See Wellman v. Whittier, 259 F.2d 163,
168 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Accordingly, Welman's case was covered by the 1940 statute,
which because of the language concerning claims, see infra note 110, did not preclude
review of a forfeiture of benefits. Wellman, 259 F.2d at 168-69.
110. See Tracy v. Gleason, 379 F.2d 469, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (veteran "no longer a
mere claimant... he is a beneficiary, and the Administrator's subsequent termination of
his benefits should not be immune from judicial scrutiny" (emphasis in original));
Thompson v. Gleason, 317 F.2d 901, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Wellman v. Whittier, 259
F.2d 163, 168-69 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
111. See Act of Aug. 12, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-376, § 8(a), 84 Stat. 787, 790; H.R. Rep.
No. 1166, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8-11, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
3723, 3731 (Congress "did not intend the fairly tortured construction adopted by the
court of appeals in the Wellman, Thompson, and Tracy holdings.").
112. 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
113. See id. at 368-71.
114. See id. at 369-70 & nn. 11 & 12 (quoting Hearing on H.R. 360, 478, 2442 and
6777 before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Veterans'Affairs, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess., 1963 (1952) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 360]).
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Court found references to these concerns in the legislative history of the
1970 amendment." 5
The dispute in Robison involved a constitutional challenge to three
statutes that the VA had interpreted as acting in concert to deny veter-
ans' educational benefits to certain conscientious objectors. 1 6 The gov-
ernment argued that section 211(a) denied jurisdiction." 7 The Court
first noted that an interpretation of section 21 l(a) purporting to bar the
Court from considering the constitutionality of veterans' benefits legisla-
tion would itself be of questionable constitutionality. I The Court, how-
ever, followed the "cardinal principle" that it will construe a statute to
avoid a constitutional question if such a course is "fairly possible.""' 9
The Court found a fairly possible construction of section 211(a) that fa-
vored the presumption of judicial review in cases challenging the consti-
tutionality of veterans' benefits legislation. 2' The Court using the Abbott
Laboratories test, failed to find in the legislative history any "clear and
convincing evidence" of congressional intent to preclude such review.,
It interpreted the section 21 l(a) prohibition as precluding only decisions
of law or fact made by the VA in administering a statute providing veter-
ans' benefits.' 22 It also defined such a decision made "under" a statute as
one made by the VA in the "application of a particular provision of a
statute to a particular set of facts."' 23 This was to be distinguished from a
challenge to the constitutionality of a veterans' benefits statute. 24 The
latter involved a decision of Congress, which had passed the statute, and
not a decision of the Administrator 25 Thus, the statute barred only
those claims involving decisions of the Administrator interpreting or ap-
115. See ia- at 371-74.
116. See id. at 362-64. The statutes at issue were: 38 U.S.C. § 101, which defined
"active duty" as full-time duty in the Armed Forces; 38 U.S.C. § 1652(a)(1), which de-
fined an "eligible veteran" for educational benefits under the Veterans' Readjustment
Benefits Act of 1966 as one serving a minimum of 180 days on "active duty," unless dis-
abled; and 38 U.S.C. § 1661(a), which provided benefits to "eligible veterans" only. The
respondent's service as a conscientious objector did not meet the statutory definition of
"active duty," despite the non-voluntary nature of his service. See Johnson v. Robison,
415 U.S. 361, 362-64 & nn.1 & 2 (1974).
117. See id. at 366.
118. See id. at 366-67 & n.8. Although the Court did not elaborate on why such an
interpretation of § 211(a) might be of questionable constitutionality, it cited several cases
as well as Professor Hart's Article on limiting appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. See id.; Hart, supra note 28.
119. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-67 (1974).
120. See id. at 373 (construction of § 211(a) permitting constitutional challenges to
veterans' benefits legislation "is not only 'fairly possible' but is the most reasonable
construction").
121. See id. at 373-74; see also supra notes 15-18, 77-80 & accompanying text.
122. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 367 (1974).
123. Id.
124. See id.
125. See id. For discussions in a later case of the impact of this interpretation of
§ 211(a), compare Weinberger v. Safi, 422 U.S. 749, 761-62 (1975) (opinion of Court,
written by Rehnquist, J.) with Salfi, 422 U.S. at 795-96 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
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plying the veterans' benefits statutes. In support of its interpretation of
section 211 (a), the Court noted that the VA itself had refused to consider
the constitutionality of the applicable benefits legislation because it
viewed such an undertaking as beyond its competence. 26 Finally, the
Court stated that permitting challenges to the constitutionality of veter-
ans' benefits legislation would not contravene the two primary purposes
of section 211(a), for it would neither burden the system or involve the
courts in determinations of VA policy.127
The precise reach of Robison is a subject of some dispute. Some courts
have limited the case to its facts. 2 ' The Court's interchangeable use of
the terms "constitutional challenge," "constitutional claim," or "consti-
tutional questions" in its opinion,'29 without tying them to the term "vet-
erans' legislation,"' 30 has led other courts to hold that section 211(a)
permits constitutional challenges to VA procedures, regulations and poli-
cies. 13 Courts adopting the narrow view of section 211(a) have cited
Robison for the proposition that section 211 (a) bars only review of VA
action involving the application of benefits statutes to a "particular set of
facts."' 1
32
Interestingly, the courts seem more likely to find action reviewable
when brought as class actions or when the decision will have a wide rang-
ing effect.' 33 The rationale is that such cases do not burden the system or
126. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 367-68 (1974).
127. See id. at 373. In reaching the merits the Court upheld the constitutionality of
the combined effect of the three statutes. See id. at 374-86; see also Hernandez v. VA, 415
U.S. 391 (1974) (companion case to Robison).
128. See, e.g., Pappanikoloaou v. Administrator of VA, 762 F.2d 8, 9 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 150 (1985); Anderson v. VA, 559 F.2d 935, 936 (5th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam); Marozsan v. United States, 635 F. Supp. 578, 580 (N.D. Ind. 1986); Cabiya San
Miguel v. United States Vet. Adm'r., 592 F. Supp. 21, 22 (D.P.R. 1984), aff'd without
opinion, 774 F.2d 1148 (1st Cir. 1985); Ryan v. Cleland, 531 F. Supp. 724, 730-31
(E.D.N.Y. 1982); Mulvaney v. Stetson, 470 F. Supp. 725, 729 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
129. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 368 (1974).
130. See id.
131. See, e.g., American Federation of Government Employees v. Nimmo, 711 F.2d
28, 31 (4th Cir. 1983); Beauchesne v. Nimmo, 562 F. Supp. 250, 254 (D. Conn. 1983)
("[flederal courts have uniformly held" that § 21 l(a) does not prevent exercise of juris-
diction); Arnolds v. VA, 507 F. Supp. 128, 131 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (review of constitutional
claims permitted); Falter v. VA, 502 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (D.N.J. 1980) (constitutional
claims to be established on their merits); Dumas v. Cleland, 486 F. Supp. 149, 151-52 (D.
Vt. 1980) (same); Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 440 F. Supp. 806, 810 (E.D. Mich. 1977),
rev'd on other grounds, 590 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1978); Plato v. Roudebush, 397 F. Supp.
1295, 1302-04 (D. Md. 1975).
132. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 367 (1974); see, e.g., American Federation
of Government Employees v. Nimmo, 711 F.2d 28, 31 (4th Cir. 1983); Evergreen State
College v. Cleland, 621 F.2d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 1980); Arnolds v. VA, 507 F. Supp. 128,
131 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Dumas v. Cleland, 486 F. Supp. 149, 152 (D. Vt. 1980); Plato v.
Roudebush, 397 F. Supp. 1295, 1302-03 (D. Md. 1975).
133. Compare Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1978) (class action,
review granted), and Plato v. Roudebush, 397 F. Supp. 1295 (D. Md. 1975) (same) and
Evergreen State College v. Cleland, 621 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1980) (college principal plain-
tiff, magnifying impact, review granted) with Roberts v. Walters, 792 F.2d 1109 (Fed.
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interfere in VA policy.134 Thus, while the minimum effect of section
211(a) is clear, the Supreme Court has never addressed the statute's full
range. Among the questions left unresolved is whether section 211(a)
bars review of actions challenged as being beyond the Administrator's
statutory authority.
III. CLAIMs THAT THE ADMINISTRATOR EXCEEDED STATUTORY
AUTHORTY
Prior to Johnson v. Robison,3 ' there existed some dicta suggesting that
despite the preclusion statute, veterans' benefits claimants enjoyed a right
to judicial review of VA actions alleged to be beyond the Agency's statu-
tory authority.1 3 6 It was not until after Robison, however, that a court
actually held that section 211(a) did not preclude all judicial review of
VA actions challenged as ultra vires. In Wayne State University v. Cle-
land, 137 plaintiffs attacked as ultra vires three VA regulations interpreting
a statutory definition of full-time study under the educational benefits
statutes. 138 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found a lack of
clear and convincing evidence that Congress intended section 211 (a) to
preclude review of the Administrator's authority to promulgate regula-
tions. 139 Moreover, review of regulations was permitted under the
APA.'" ° The decision affirmed a district court holding141 that section
211(a) precluded review of only decisions concerning individual claims
under the veterans' benefits statutes and not the sort of review sought by
the plaintiffs. 142
The Sixth Circuit opinion relied heavily on Robison. In addition to
Cir. 1986) (single plaintiff, no review) and Traynor v. Walters, 791 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1986)
(same), cert granted sub nor. Traynor v. Turnage, 55 U.S.L.W. 3607 (U.S. Mar. 10,
1987) (No. 86-622) and Ryan v. Cleland, 531 F. Supp. 724 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (same).
134. These suits are seen as not involving the merits of individual claims or likely to
spawn a rash of suits second guessing Administrator action. They are seen also as not
involving the "technical niceties" of VA policy but merely determine whether the regula-
tions or actions are consistent with statutory authority. See, eg., Wayne State Univ. v.
Cleland, 590 F.2d 627, 631-32 (6th Cir. 1978); Merged Area X (Educ.) v. Cleland, 604
F.2d 1075, 1078 (8th Cir. 1979); Arnolds v. VA, 507 F. Supp. 128, 130 (N.D. Ill. 1981);
Plato v. Roudebush, 397 F. Supp. 1295, 1303 (D. Md. 1975).
135. 415 U.S. 361 0974).
136. See, eg., Holley v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 175, 176 (S.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd
without opinion, 477 F.2d 600 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1023 0973); Steinmasel v.
United States, 202 F. Supp. 335, 337 (D.S.D. 1962); Siegel v. United States, 87 F. Supp.
555, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1949).
137. 590 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1978).
138. See id. at 628-30. Although the statute, 38 U.S.C. § 1788(a)(4), and the regula-
tions, 38 C.F.R. § 21.4272, 38 C.F.R. § 21.4200, Department of Veterans' Benefits
(D.V.B.) Circular 20-77-16, all have since been amended, their relevant texts are re-
printed in Wayne State, 590 F.2d at 628-29 & nn.2-4.
139. See Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627, 631-32 (6th Cir. 1978).
140. See id. at 631; see also supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
141. See Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 440 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Mich. 1977), rev'd on
other grounds, 590 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1978).
142. See id. at 808-09.
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holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard necessary to pre-
clude review was not met, 143 the Wayne State court analogized the effects
of permitting review of the VA's promulgation of regulations to the ef-
fects of permitting constitutional review of veterans' benefits legisla-
tion. 1" In Robison, the Supreme Court had reasoned that application of
section 211 (a) to constitutional challenges would not serve the primary
purposes of the statute. 4 ' The Sixth Circuit found the same to be true of
challenges to the VA's authority to promulgate regulations. 46 The court
stated that such suits do not involve the courts in the details of VA poli-
cies, but merely determine if the regulations had been promulgated pur-
suant to statutory authority. 47 The court also reasoned that such review
does not encourage suits asking for review of individual benefits claims,
because a decision affecting a regulation affects many potential
litigants. 148
The Wayne State court made two other observations. First, it noted
that all cases barring judicial review had involved individual benefits ad-
judications, and neither the Supreme Court nor the Sixth Circuit had
ever ruled that section 211(a) barred review of regulations.1 49 Second,
the court opined that an interpretation of section 211(a) preventing re-
view of regulations raises the same questions about the constitutionality
of section 211 (a) as an interpretation barring constitutional review of vet-
erans' benefits legislation would have raised in Robison. 5° The Sixth
Circuit adopted the Robison Court's approach by finding a "fairly possi-
ble" interpretation of section 211(a) that avoided the constitutional
question. 1 5'
When the Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits faced
identical challenges to the same regulations, they adopted the reasoning
of Wayne State.'52 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also
adopted this reasoning on similar facts.153 The Courts of Appeals for
143. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
144. See Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627, 631-32 (6th Cir. 1978). Com-
pare id. (discussing review of regulations and primary purposes of § 211(a)) with Johnson
v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 368-74 (1974) (discussing review of statutes for constitutionality
and primary purposes of § 211(a)).
145. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373 (1974).
146. See Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627, 631-32 (6th Cir. 1978).
147. See id. at 631-32.
148. See id. at 631.
149. See id. at 632.
150. See id. at 632 & n.13.
151. See id. at 631-32; see also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-67, 373 (1974).
152. See Evergreen State College v. Cleland, 621 F.2d 1002, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 1980);
Merged Area X (Educ.) v. Cleland, 604 F.2d 1075, 1077-78 (8th Cir. 1979). In these cases
as well as in Wayne State the VA had certified all students in these colleges' "non-tradi-
tional programs" as part-time rather than full-time students. See Evergreen, 621 F.2d at
1007-08; Merged Area X, 604 F.2d at 1077; Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627,
630 (6th Cir. 1978).
153. See University of Md. v. Cleland, 621 F.2d 98, 100-01 (4th Cir. 1980). The Uni-
versity had sued the VA in a dispute over the VA's refusal to issue checks assigned to the
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both the Second and Federal Circuits refused to follow Wayne State.
These courts took a broad view of section 211 (a) and held that challenges
to the Administration's authority to promulgate regulations is within the
statute's preclusive purview."
In Roberts v. Walters, 5 a veteran challenged a regulation providing
him with part-time rather than full-time educational benefits." 6 Re-
jecting the Wayne State line of cases, the Federal Circuit held that sec-
tion 211(a) barred review." 7 Although it considered itself bound by
precedent, 58 the Roberts court believed that the Supreme Court had cre-
ated no exception to section 211(a), but had "read the constitutional
challenge as being in consonance with that section."'5 9 The court stated
that its construction of section 211(a) harmonized with that of the
Supreme Court in Robison."6
In Traynor v. Walters,"6' the Second Circuit heard a challenge to a VA
regulation said to be in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.11
University by students on active duty to pay for courses offered through a VA program.
See id. at 98-99.
154. See Roberts v. Walters, 792 F.2d 1109, 1110-11 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Traynor v. Wal-
ters, 791 F.2d 226, 230-31 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. granted sub nomn. Traynor v. Turnage, 55
U.S.L.W. 3607 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1987) (No. 86-622).
155. 792 F.2d 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
156. See id. at 1110.
157. See id. at 1111.
158. See id. The court cited a decision of its predecessor court, the appellate jurisdic-
tion of the United States Court of Claims, see Baker v. United States, 225 Ct. Cl. 668
(1980), which in turn cited a long line of its prior decisions denying review of veterans'
educational benefits determinations. See e.g., Cunningham v. United States, 549 F.2d
753 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert denied, 445 U.S. 969 (1980); Jennings v. United States, 214 Ct. Cl.
789 (1977).
159. Roberts v. Walters, 792 F.2d 1109, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
160. See id.
161. 791 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. granted sub nor. Traynor v. Turnage, 55
U.S.L.W. 3607 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1987) (No. 86-622).
162. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). The plaintiff challenged the VA's decision to cut off
his educational benefits as a violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1982). That statute prohibits discrimination against the handicapped in the
administration of federal programs. See id. The VA had terminated the plaintiff's bene-
fits pursuant to a statutory requirement, 38 U.S.C. § 1662(a)(1) (Supp. 1H 1985), that
limits VA educational assistance to a period of ten years immediately following discharge
from the service. See Traynor v. Walters, 791 F.2d 226, 227 (2d Cir. 1986), cert granted
sub nom. Traynor v. Turnage, 55 U.S.L.W. 3607 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1987) (No. 86-622). The
statute, however, permits an extension in the deadline if the veteran was prevented from
pursuing an education program due to a disability not the result of his own willful mis-
conduct. See 38 U.S.C. § 1662(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985). The VA, however, considers alco-
holism the result of willful misconduct unless it is caused by an underlying psychiatric
disorder. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.301(c)(2) (1986). Because the plaintiff could not prove that
his alcoholism, which had delayed his seeking an education, was not willful misconduct
the VA refused to grant him an extension. See Traynor, 791 F.2d at 227-28. The plaintiff
contended 38 C.F.R. § 3.301(c)(2) violated 29 U.S.C. § 794. See Traynor, 791 F.2d 228.
For other cases in which veterans challenge this regulation as a violation of the Rehabili-
tation Act, see McKelvey v. Turnage, 792 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. granted sub
non. McKelvey v. Turnage, 55 U.S.L.W. 3607 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1987) (No. 86-737); Ti'mch
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Applying the Abbott Laboratories test, the court found clear and convinc-
ing evidence of congressional intent to preclude review.' 63 The Second
Circuit rejected the Wayne State line of cases for two reasons. First, un-
like the Wayne State cases where the large class of potential plaintiffs had
increased the applicability of the decisions and thus limited future litiga-
tion, this case involved only one plaintiff.16 The court classified the
Wayne State cases as involving broad challenges to a regulation by insti-
tutions interested in the general operation of the benefits program, rather
than the denial of benefits in individual cases. 165
Second, the court questioned the rationale of the Wayne State holding.
It initially stated that there was no constitutional difficulty in Congress
precluding the type of review sought in this case. 166 The language of
section 211 (a) alone provided clear and convincing evidence of an intent
to bar review of plaintiff's claim. 167 The court found support for its
broad interpretation of section 211(a) by comparing the statute's lan-
guage to the preclusion statute construed in Briscoe v. Bell.' 68 The court
v. Walters, 573 F. Supp. 346 (E.D. Tenn. 1983), aff'd, 765 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1985); see
also Burns v. Nimmo, 545 F. Supp. 544, 547 (N.D. Iowa 1982) (constitutional challenge
to regulation).
163. See Traynor v. Walters, 791 F.2d 226, 231 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. granted sub nor.
Traynor v. Turnage, 55 U.S.L.W. 3607 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1987) (No. 86-622).
164. See id. at 227, 230.
165. See id. at 230.
166. See id.
167. See id. The Second Circuit noted that the Wayne State court had ignored the
"unambiguous language of Section 21 l(a) itself." Id. Although the Wayne State court
undertook no analysis of the language of § 21 l(a) in its decision, it did state that the text
and legislative history failed to provide clear and convincing evidence of an intent to
preclude review. See Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627, 632 (6th Cir. 1978).
168. 432 U.S. 404 (1977) (vacating and remanding Briscoe v. Levi, 535 F.2d 1259
(D.C. Cir. 1976)). The petitioners in Briscoe had sought review of decisions of the Attor-
ney General and Director of the Census under § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42
U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1970 & Supp. V). Briscoe, 432 U.S. at 405-08. This section had pro-
vided that "'[a] determination or certification of the Attorney General or of the Director
of the Census under this section ... shall not be reviewable in any court. . . .'" Id. at
408. The D.C. Circuit had held that even in the face of this preclusion statute "a limited
jurisdiction exists in the court to review actions which on their face are plainly in excess
of statutory authority." Briscoe v. Levi, 535 F.2d 1259, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1976), vacated &
remanded sub nom. Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404 (1977). The Supreme Court vacated the
D.C. Circuit judgment holding that the statute "could hardly prohibit judicial review in
more explicit terms .... The language is absolute on its face and would appear to admit
of no exceptions." Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404, 409-10 (1977). The Court ignored a line
of cases stretching from the early twentieth century to the 1950's in which it had stated
that courts possess the power to restrain officials acting in excess of their statutory power.
See, e.g., Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 581-82 (1958) (per curiam) (judicial relief
generally available to one injured by official exceeding his statutory authority); Stark v.
Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944) ("The responsibility of determining the limits of statu-
tory grants of authority [to administrative agencies] is a judicial function entrusted to the
courts by Congress .... ."); Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R., 305 U.S. 177, 185 (1938)
(court can decide extent of official's statutory authority); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson,
223 U.S. 605, 621-22 (1912) (courts possess equitable power to restrain official's ultra vires
invasion of a property right); American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187
U.S. 94, 108 (1902) (courts may act if official action not authorized by statute). Interest-
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also noted that in cases where the Supreme Court had construed other
preclusion statutes and found a lack of sufficient proof of intent to pre-
clude review, it had been the express language of the statutes in question
that had failed to provide the proof necessary to preclude review.
1 69
Thus, the court stated that Wayne State had relied too much on the sup-
posed compatibility between permitting review challenging VA authority
to promulgate regulations, and the two primary purposes of section
211(a), and not enough on the plain language of the statute.170
Finally, Falter v. Veterans' Administration, 17 illustrates a third ap-
proach to challenging VA promulgation of regulations. The plaintiffs
challenged the VA's operation of a hospital on the ground that it violated
numerous statutes, some of which were not specifically veterans' legisla-
tion. 172 The plaintiffs cited Wayne State as permitting review of such
agency action because it involved general VA operations and not individ-
ual benefits adjudications. 173 The court rejected this view of section
211(a)." 4 Although the Falter court agreed that this was a primary pur-
ingly these cases were also ignored by the Wayne State court and courts following its
decision. See Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1978). In some of
these cases, however, there was no statute purporting to bar review. Sea e.g., Philadel-
phia Co., 223 U.S. 605 (1912); American School, 187 U.S. 94 (1902). In others, some other
form of review existed. Sea eg., Wickard, 321 U.S. at 308-09. They are no doubt ig-
nored in favor of more modem cases construing the APA and the modem preclusion
statutes. See supra notes 11-18, 71-80 and accompanying text. In Traynor, the court
analogized the effect of the language of § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act to that of
§ 211(a). Compare Briscoe, 432 U.S. at 408-10 (Supreme Court vacated D.C. Circuit
opinion finding residual jurisdiction to review actions "'which on their face are plainly in
excess of statutory authority'" despite preclusion statute) with Traynor, 791 F.2d at 230
("[W]e perceive no doubts about the statute's constitutionality... [if it] permits the VA
alone to determine whether its regulations carried out the intent of Congress's enabling
act."). Thus, if no residual power existed to review actions under the Voting Rights Act,
none existed under § 211(a). Also, the claim that such an interpretation would be of
questionable constitutionality, a concern raised by the Wayne State court, has little merit.
See Traynor, 791 F.2d at 230; supra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing Wayne
State court's concern over the constitutionality of an interpretion of § 211(a) that would
bar review of regulations).
169. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971);
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967); Brownell v. Tom We
Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 185 (1956); Traynor v. Walters, 791 F.2d 226, 230-31 (2d Cir. 1986)
(citing Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 566 (1975)), cert. granted sub nom. Traynor
v. Turnage, 55 U.S.L.W. 3607 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1987) (No. 86-622).
170. See Traynor v. Walters, 791 F.2d 226, 230 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. granted sub nom.
Traynor v. Turnage, 55 U.S.L.W. 3607 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1987) (No. 86-622).
171. 502 F. Supp. 1178 (D.N.J. 1980).
172. See id. at 1179. The statutes not a part of veterans' benefits law included: §§ 504
and 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 794, 794(a), the rulemaking pro-
cedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 553 (1982 & Supp. III
1985); and the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C
§§ 6000-6083 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) seq. Falter, 502 F. Supp. at 1179. The plaintiffs
also claimed the hospital's operation violated numerous constitutional provisions. See id.
at 1179.
173. See id. at 1180-81.
174. See id. at 1181.
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pose of the statute, 17 5 it also noted that the language of the statute, the
Robison opinion, and the legislative history of the 1970 amendment all
indicated that section 211(a) was to have a far broader effect.176 The
court held that section 211 (a) barred a challenge to hospital operations,
because such operations "precisely fit the statutory language in that they
are questions of law... aris[ing] in relation to the V.A.'s administration
of laws providing hospital benefits for veterans."' 17 7 The court also stated
that such challenges would thwart the policy embodied in section 211 (a)
of keeping the courts out of day-to-day VA business.178
The precise reach of section 211 (a)-specifically its application to re-
view of claims challenging VA action as ultra vires-is unclear. There
appear to be three views: that at least review of the authority to promul-
gate regulations is permitted;179 a possible middle ground forbidding re-
view of allegedly ultra vires action when the case involves only individual
adjudications; 80 and that no such review is permitted.' 8 ' Part IV ana-
lyzes the conclusions reached in these cases and argues for a broad read-
ing of section 211(a).
IV. SECTION 211(A) PRECLUDES REVIEW OF ALLEGEDLY ULTRA
VIRES ADMINISTRATOR ACTION
To determine whether and to what extent a statute precludes judicial
review, a court examines the statute's express language, its objectives, its
legislative history, the structure of the statutory scheme and the nature of
the administrative action involved.'8 2 The action is presumed reviewable
unless clear and convincing evidence of intent to preclude review is pres-
ent, 18 3 or there is no substantial doubt as to congressional intent to pre-
175. See id.
176. See id. at 1180-81. The court quoted from the legislative history of the 1970
amendment to § 211(a): "The restated section 21 l(a) will make it perfectly clear that the
Congress intends to exclude from judicial review all determinations with respect to non-
contractual benefits provided for veterans and their dependents and survivors." H.R.
Rep. No. 1166, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 3723, 3731.
177. Falter v. VA, 502 F. Supp. 1178, 1180 (D.N.J. 1980).
178. See id.
179. See supra notes 137-153 and accompanying text.
180. See Traynor v. Walters, 791 F.2d 226, 230 (2d Cir. 1986) (distinguishing Wayne
State Univ. v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1978), on ground that Wayne State affected
many persons rather than single plaintiff), cert. granted sub nom. Traynor v. Turnage, 55
U.S.L.W. 3607 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1987) (No. 86-622).
181. See supra notes 155-178 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 15-16, 77-80 and accompanying text.
This Court has... never applied the 'clear and convincing evidence' standard
in the strict evidentiary sense .... Rather, the Court has found the standard
met, and the presumption favoring judicial review overcome, whenever the con-
gressional intent to preclude judicial review is 'fairly discernible in the statutory
scheme.' In the context of preclusion analysis, the 'clear and convincing evi-
dence' standard is not a rigid evidentiary test but a useful reminder to courts
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elude it.1" In short, this determination is an exercise in statutory
analysis, which is a search for legislative intent."8 5 The intentions or
spirit of the statute should guide all interpretations of its language. 86
A. Express Language
To determine whether section 211 (a) precludes judicial review of chal-
lenges to Administrator action as allegedly ultra vires, the analysis must
begin with the statute's express language. Courts most often invoke the
plain meaning rule: 87 if the statutory authority is clear and unambigu-
ous, the court should hold it to mean what it plainly expresses. 88 This is
the most settled canon of statutory construction. 89 To discredit plain
meaning, a party must show either that language elsewhere in the act
that, where substantial doubt about the congressional intent exists, the general
presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action is controlling.
Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 350-51 (1984) (citations omitted)
(quoting from Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156-57
(1970)).
184. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
185. See United States v. Argrillo-Ladlad, 675 F.2d 905, 907-09 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 829 (1982); Lavin v. Marsh, 644 F.2d 1378, 1380-81(9th Cir. 1981). See
generally 2A N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 45.05, at 22 (Sands 4th ed.
1984) (collecting cases) ("None of these methods [of statutory construction] can be criti-
cized if they in fact reflect the intent of the legislature, but none can be supported when
they result in a finding of legislative intent which did not in fact exist within the
legislature.").
186. See Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975); Mastro Plastics Corp. v.
NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 279-89 (1956); Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prod., 322 U.S. 607,
609-11 (1944); see also 2A N. Singer, supra note 185, §§ 45.05, 46.05. Chancellor Kent has
said that
'[i]n the exposition of a statute the intention of the lawmaker will prevail over
the literal sense of the terms; and its reason and intention will prevail over the
strict letter. When the words are not explicit, the intention is to be collected
from the context; from the occasion and necessity of the law; from the mischief
felt and the remedy in view; and the intention should be taken or presumed
according to what is consistent with reason and good discretion.'
Id § 46.05, at 92 (quoting Kent's Commentaries 462 (13th ed. 1884)).
187. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980) ("We begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting
point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself."); Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in
the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed ...."); see also
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 367 0974) (Court begins its interpretation of § 211(a)
with examination of the statute's text.). See generally 2A N. Singer, supra note 185,
§ 46.01, at 73 (discussing form of plain meaning rule).
188. See United States v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 315 (1953); Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). See generally 2A N. Singer, supra note 185,
§ 46.01 (collecting cases discussing plain meaning rule).
189. See United States v. McFillin, 487 F. Supp. 1130, 1133 n.4 (D. Md. 1980) ("When
the words of a statute are not ambiguous ... the '"plain meaning" rule of statutory
interpretation' is applicable." (citation omitted)); Swarts v. Siegel, 117 F. 13, 18-19 (8th
Cir. 1902) ("There is no safer or better settled canon of interpretation than that when
language is clear and unambiguous it must be held to mean what it plainly expresses
.... "). See generally 2A N. Singer, supra note 185, § 46.01, at 73-80 (collecting cases
discussing plain meaning rule).
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expands or restricts the meaning of the statute in question, the provision
is repugnant to the general provisions of the act or that the legislative
history casts doubt on results obtained through using the plain meaning
rule. 1 9
0
The plain meaning of section 211 (a) appears to preclude most judicial
review of VA action. The language of the statute is very broad. Deci-
sions that hold that review of VA actions is precluded all mention the
statute's plain language. 91 Departures from the plain language of the
statute are rare, 192 suggesting that in most cases preclusion is plainly
warranted. There is no disagreement that at the very least the statute
precludes review of individual fact based adjudications. 93 Even courts
that are hostile to a broad application of section 211(a) find such actions
unreviewable.' 94 Preclusion should also apply to individual fact based
adjudications when it is claimed that VA action applying a regulation is
ultra vires. The language of section 211 (a) is "patently broad enough to
encompass" an argument that a regulation was "unreasonably applied"
190. See 2A N. Singer, supra note 185, § 46.01, at 74; see also Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) ("Absent a clearly expressed
legislative intention to the contrary, [the] language [of the statute] must ordinarily be
regarded as conclusive."); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("It is
elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the
language in which the act is framed . . ").
191. See, e.g., Roberts v. Walters, 792 F.2d 1109, 1110-11 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (court invokes
plain language of statute to affirm lower court holding that judicial review was pre-
cluded); Traynor v. Walters, 791 F.2d 226, 231 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[T]he language of section
21 l(a) itself provides clear and convincing evidence of congressional intent to bar judicial
review the type of claim raised by [plaintiff]."), cert. granted sub nom. Traynor v.
Turnage, 55 U.S.L.W. 3607 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1987) (No. 86-622); Milliken v. Gleason, 332
F.2d 122, 123 (1st Cir. 1964) ("[tjhis command is categorical"), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
1002 (1965); Falter v. VA, 502 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (D.N.J. 1980) (court concludes that
"broad language of § 211(a) requires" that review is precluded of VA actions challenged
as ultra vires); see also Pappanikoloaou v. Administrator of VA, 762 F.2d 8, 9 (2d Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 150 (1985); Anderson v. VA, 559 F.2d 935, 936 (5th
Cir. 1977) (per curiam); 5 K. Davis, supra note 11, § 28:13, at 321.
192. See cases cited in supra note 9; 5'K. Davis, supra note 11, § 28:13, at 321.
193. See, e.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 367 (1974) (§ 211(a) does not bar
review of constitutionality of veterans' benefits legislation); Traynor v. Walters, 791 F.2d
226, 229 (2d. Cir. 1986) ("[The VA] has never disclaimed its authority to determine
whether its own regulations.., are properly applied to a particular case."), cert. granted
sub nom. Traynor v. Turnage, 55 U.S.L.W. 3607 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1987) (No. 86-622);
Merged Area X (Educ.) v. Cleland, 604 F.2d 1075, 1078 (8th Cir. 1979) (§ 211(a) permits
review of VA authority to promulgate regulations); Falter v. VA, 502 F. Supp. 1178, 1180-
81 (D.N.J. 1980) (§ 211(a) permits review of constitutional but not statutory claims);
Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 440 F. Supp. 806, 808-09 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (§ 211(a)
prohibits review of only individual claims for benefits), rev'd on other grounds, 590 F.2d
627 (6th Cir. 1978).
194. See, e.g., Evergreen State College v. Cleland, 621 F.2d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 1980);
University of Md. v. Cleland, 621 F.2d 98, 100 (4th Cir. 1980); Merged Area X (Educ.) v.
Cleland, 604 F.2d 1075, 1078 (8th Cir. 1979); Falter v. VA, 502 F. Supp. 1178, 1180-81(D.N.J. 1980); Dumas v. Cleland, 486 F. Supp. 149, 151-52 (D. Vt. 1980); Wayne State
Univ. v. Cleland, 440 F. Supp. 806, 808-09 (E.D. Mich. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 590
F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1978); Plato v. Roudebush, 397 F. Supp. 1295, 1301-02 (D. Md. 1975).
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in a certain situation.195
Courts find the power to review VA actions allegedly ultra vires in
cases joining numerous plaintiffs or controlling the results of many po-
tential adjudications. 19 6 The cases frequently involve application of VA
regulations or general policy. 197 The courts cite two reasons for permit-
ting such review. The first is that certain language in Robison mandates
such a result.198 The second is that such review is permissible because
the review is consistent with the "two primary purposes" of section
211 (a).'9 9 Nevertheless, this reasoning ignores the plain language of the
statute. The resulting "exceptions" are in concert with neither the stat-
ute nor the Supreme Court's interpretation of it in Robison."m
The Supreme Court discussed the Robison decision in Weinberger v.
Salfi,20' another preclusion case involving a different statute. The Court
stated that it had held in Robison that constitutional challenges to veter-
ans' legislation were not within the express language of section 211(a)
because the statute precluded review of decisions of the Administrator on
195. Traynor v. Walters, 791 F.2d 226, 229 (2d Cir. 1986) (§ 21 l(a) precludes review of
VA application of alcoholism regulation alleged to have been ultra vires), cert. granted sub
nom Traynor v. Turnage, 55 U.S.L.W. 3607 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1987) (No. 86-622); see Rob-
erts v. Walters, 792 F.2d 1109, 1110-11 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (§ 211(a) precludes review of VA
application of VA educational benefits regulation alleged to have been ultra vires).
196. See, eg., Evergreen State College v. Cleland, 621 F.2d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 1980)
(court finds § 211(a) inapplicable where university and students challenge educational
benefits regulations); University of Md. v. Cleland, 621 F.2d 98, 100 (4th Cir. 1980) (court
states that purposes of § 211(a) would not be served by application of § 211(a) where
university challenges VA actions concerning assignment of student veterans' benefits);
Merged Area X (Educ.) v. Cleland, 604 F.2d 1075, 1078 (8th Cir. 1979) (court finds that
where university and student challenge educational benefits regulations purposes of
§ 211(a) are not served by precluding judicial review); Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 440
F. Supp. 806, 807 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 590 F.2d 627 (6th
Cir. 1978).
197. See supra note 196.
198. See Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 440 F. Supp. 806, 808 (E.D. Mich. 1977), rev'd
on other grounds, 590 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1978). The language cited is: "A decision of law
or fact 'under' a statute is made by the Administrator in the interpretation or application
of a particular provision of a statute to a particular set of facts." Johnson v. Robison, 415
U.S. 361, 367 (1974).
199. See eg. University of Md. v. Cleland, 621 F.2d 98, 100 (4th Cir. 1980) (citing
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 370 (1974)); Merged Area X (Educ.) v. Cleland, 604
F.2d 1075, 1078 (8th Cir. 1979); Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627, 631-32 (6th
Cir. 1978); see also supra note 113 and accompanying text.
200. See Roberts v. Walters, 792 F.2d 1109, 11o-11 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The Federal Circuit
noted the Supreme Court in Robison had read § 211(a) as barring review of decisions of
law arising in the administration by the VA of a veterans' benefits statute. See id. at 1111.
Because a constitutional challenge to veterans' benefits statutes involves decisions of Con-
gress that create a statutory class, § 211(a), which applied to decisions of the Administra-
tor, did not bar the courts from reviewing such challenges. See id.; see also supra notes
124-126 and accompanying text. Thus, permitting constitutional challenges was actually
in consonance with § 211(a) and no exceptions to the statute had been created. See Rob-
errs, 792 F.2d at 1111. Since no exceptions existed the court was without power to review
the educational benefits regulation challenged in Roberts. See id. at 1110-11. Supreme
Court dictum also supports this view. See infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
201. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
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any question of law or fact, but did not preclude review of the constitu-
tionality of a statute, the passage of which was a decision of Congress
and not the Administrator.20 2 As another court has noted, this meant
that the Robison Court had not "creat[ed] an exception to § 211 (a) but
[had] read the constitutional challenge as being in consonance with that
section."203 Since any claim that VA action is ultra vires challenges a
"decision of the Administrator," such action should be precluded from
judicial review.
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Salfi and author of Robison, had a dif-
ferent view of the holding in Robison. He saw Robison as turning on
whether the claim arose under the statute or the Constitution.2° Ac-
cording to Justice Brennan, a claim arises under a statute if it alleges that
the statute grants someone certain rights, while it arises under the Con-
stitution if it "seeks to hold invalid the result which would be reached
under the statute itself. '20 5 When a person claims that the VA has acted
beyond its statutory authority, the claim is that the agency failed to
award benefits as rights granted by the statute. 2°6 Therefore, even under
Justice Brennan's view such claims are outside the holding in Robison.2 7
Perhaps a distinction can be wrung between exceeding statutory au-
thority to issue regulations208 and operating in violation of statutes not
directly "providing benefits for veterans" but statutes affecting veterans'
202. See id. at 761-62; supra notes 121-125 and accompanying text.
203. Roberts v. Walters, 792 F.2d 1109, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1986). See supra note 200 and
accompanying text.
204. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 795-96 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 795.
206. See, e.g., Roberts v. Walters, 792 F.2d 1109, 110 (Fed, Cir. 1986) (claim that regu-
lations did not follow plain language of statute, and thereby denied appellant educational
benefits); Traynor v. Walters, 791 F.2d 226, 227-28 (2d Cir. 1986) (claim that alcoholism
regulation violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and, thereby, denied plaintiff educa-
tional benefits), cert. granted sub nom. Traynor v. Turnage, 55 U.S.L.W. 3607 (U.S. Mar.
10, 1987) (No. 86-622); Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627, 630 (6th Cir. 1978)
(claim that VA regulations interpreting educational benefits statute and denying full-time
educational benefits did not follow statute and, thereby, blocked award of deserved bene-
fits); Falter v. VA, 502 F. Supp. 1178, 1178-79 (D.N.J. 1980) (claim that VA hospital oper-
ated in violation of numerous statutory provisions).
207. Justice Brennan defined the term "'arising under' [as] a term of art in jurisdic-
tional statutes referring, at least in part, to the body of law necessary to consider in order
to determine the rights in question." Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 797 (1975) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). Certainly, when the courts considered if the regulations challenged in
Wayne State were consistent with the statute, they considered the veterans' benefits stat-
utes, "law[s] administered by the Veterans' Administration providing benefits for veter-
ans . . ." 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982). See Evergreen State College v. Cleland, 621 F.2d
1002, 1009-12 (9th Cir. 1980) (court considered if regulation properly interpreted and
applied the statute it was promulgated to interpret and apply); Merged Area X (Educ.) v.
Cleland, 604 F.2d 1075, 1078-81 (8th Cir. 1979) (same); Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 590
F.2d 627, 632-35 (6th Cir. 1978) (same).
208. The regulations in the educational benefits cases were challenged as an improper
interpretation the statute's mandate which resulted in the plaintiffs failing to receive the
benefits to which they were entitled by law. See, e.g., Roberts v. Walters, 792 F.2d 1109,
1110 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1978).
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benefits legislation.' For example, statutes outside the veterans' bene-
fits title of the United States Code control the VA's operation of hospitals
and treatment of the handicapped.210 Several courts have held that the
effect of these statutes on veterans' benefits legislation is "a question of
law... under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration
providing benefits for veterans" and are thereby precluded by section
211(a).2 11 At least one court has distinguished these cases from cases in
which the VA's authority to promulgate regulations is challenged.2" 2 The
distinction, however, appears to make little difference.
The courts' phrase "authority to issue regulations," implies that such
regulations properly interpret and apply the veterans' benefits statutes,
213
and not that the regulations were issued in violation of the rulemaking
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.214 In several cases
plaintiffs have claimed that regulations issued by the VA regarding the
interpretation and application of a statute in fact violate it.21 5 These cases
involved challenges to the Administrator's authority to issue regulations
pursuant to section 210(c)(), 2 16 which grants the Administrator the au-
209. These statutes exist outside the veterans' benefits law yet impose requirements on
the VA in its administration of benefits, for example, that it not discriminate against
benefits recipients. The statutes also impose requirements on other federal and state
agencies. See, eg., Traynor v. Walters, 791 F.2d 226, 228 (2d Cir. 1986) (VA must abide
by Rehabilitation Act section (29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973)) prohibiting discrimination based
upon an individual handicap), cert. granted sub nom. Traynor v. Turnage, 55 U.S.LW.
3607 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1987) (No. 86-622); Falter v. VA, 502 F. Supp. 1178, 1179 (D.NJ.
1980) (court citing to various statutes that effect the conduct of the VA).
210. See Traynor v. Walters, 791 F.2d 226, 227-28 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. granted sub
nom. Traynor v. Turnage, 55 U.S.L.W. 3607 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1987) (No. 86-622); Falter v.
VA, 502 F. Supp. 1178, 1179-80 (D.N.J. 1980); supra note 172; supra note 162 and accom-
panying text.
211. Traynor v. Walters, 791 F.2d 226, 228-31 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. granted sub nora.
Traynor v. Turnage, 55 U.S.L.W. 3607 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1987) (No. 86-622); see Falter v.
VA, 502 F. Supp. 1178, 180-81 (D.N.J. 1980).
212. Falter v. VA, 502 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (D.N.J. 1980) ("The present case is distin-
guishable from [the Wayne State] cases because no challenge is being made to the V.A.'s
authority to promulgate rules, rather the plaintiffs contend that the V.A. at [the hospital]
is failing to live up to its statutory obligations.").
213. See e.g., Evergreen State College v. Cleland, 621 F.2d 1002, 1009 n.10 (9th Cir.
1980) ("Procedural regularity in the promulgation of the regulations and circular was not
challenged by appellees and therefore requires no further discussion."); Merged Area X
(Educ.) v. Cleland, 604 F.2d 1075, 1078-81 (8th Cir. 1979) (analyzing the challenge to the
VA's authority as posing two distinct questions: "(1) does the VA have the authority to
establish twelve semester hours... as the minimum a veteran can carry and still be
considered a full-time student, and (2) does the VA have the authority to define 'semester
hours' as twelve hours in class per week for one standard semester term?"); Wayne State
Univ. v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627, 632-34 (6th Cir. 1978).
214. See Administrative Procedure Act, § 553, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). Although VA
benefit regulations are exempt from the terms of § 553, see 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2), the VA
has agreed to follow it under its own regulation. See 38 C.F.R. § 1.12 (1986).
215. See supra note 213.
216. See 38 U.S.C. § 210(c)(1) (1982); see; e.g., Evergreen State College v. Cleland, 621
F.2d 1002, 1008 (8th Cir. 1980); Merged Area X (Educ.) v. Cleland, 604 F.2d 1075, 1080
(8th Cir. 1979); Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627, 633 (6th Cir. 1978).
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thority to issue all rules and regulations that are consistent with and nec-
essary or appropriate to the laws administered by the Veterans'
Administration. 7 These cases, however, may be viewed as similar to
cases that have held that review of decisions of law are precluded when
the action involved the applicability of statutes that direct Administrator
action, but do not actually provide veterans benefits. Section 210(c)(1)
can be viewed as such a statute. It authorizes the Administrator to pro-
mulgate regulations necessary to and consistent with the veterans' bene-
fits statutes yet it in no way actually awards any benefits. 218  The
promulgation of regulations pursuant to section 210(c)(1) is certainly a
decision of law affecting statutes "providing benefits to veterans.
21 9
Hence, there is no relevant distinction between the two lines of cases.220
Both types of ultra vires challenges appear to be non-reviewable even
under the narrowest view of the scope of section 211 (a) that only individ-
ual fact based determinations are precluded from review. This view of
the scope of section 21 l(a) is based on the language "[a] decision of law
or fact 'under' a statute is made by the Administrator in the interpreta-
tion or application of a particular provision of the statute to a particular
set of facts.1 221 The promulgation and application of regulations cer-
tainly interprets or applies a particular provision of the statute to a par-
217. See 38 U.S.C. § 210(c)(1) (1982).
218. See id.
219. See, e.g., Traynor v. Walters, 791 F.2d 226, 227 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. granted sub
nom. Traynor v. Turnage, 55 U.S.L.W. 3607 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1987) (No. 86-622). In Tray-
nor, the alcoholism regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 3.301(c)(2) (1986), defined 38 U.S.C.
§ 1662(a)(1) in such a manner to deny Traynor an extension of his period of eligibility for
veterans' educational benefits. See Traynor, 791 F.2d at 227. Section 1662(a)(1) permits
an extension of eligibility if the veteran is prevented from pursuing an educational pro-
gram by a disability if the disability was not the result of willful misconduct. The statute,
however, does not define willful misconduct. See 38 U.S.C. § 1662(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
It is the VA regulation promulgated pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 210(c)(1) that defines the
term. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.301(c)(2). Thus it was the alcoholism regulation that affected §
1662(a)(1) and denied Traynor his benefits. See Traynor, 791 F.2d at 227. See also
Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627, 628-30 (6th Cir. 1978) (regulations applying
definition of full-time study deny such status to non-traditional college program). Thus
in both cases the promulgation of these regulations affected the outcome of the benefits
determination.
220. See Traynor v. Walters, 791 F.2d 226, 228-31 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. granted sub
nom. Traynor v. Turnage, 55 U.S.L.W. 3607 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1987) (No. 86-622). Like the
Falter case in which the court held that the effect of statutes outside Title 38 on veterans
benefits legislation was a decision of law under § 211(a) not subject to judicial review, see
supra notes 171-178 and accompanying text, the Traynor court also held that the effect of
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 on the educational benefits statutes was precluded
by § 211(a). See Traynor, 791 F.2d at 229-30. The Falter court, however, distinguished
the Wayne State cases from its own facts citing Wayne State as involving the VA's author-
ity to promulgate regulations. See supra notes 173-174 and accompanying text. Yet the
Traynor court questioned the rationale of the Wayne State cases, holding that § 211 (a)
also precluded review of the VA authority to promulgate regulations. See Traynor, 791
F.2d at 230-3 1. Thus, it appears to make little difference whether the action challenged is
based upon a statute outside Title 38 or is premised on the VA's authority to promulgate
regulations. See Traynor, 791 F.2d at 228-31.
221. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 367 (1974); see supra note 198.
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ticular set of facts." 2 Since regulations are the tools that interpret or
apply the statute, the conceptual difference between authority to promul-
gate regulations and reaching beyond outer statutory limits is irrelevant
in the face of the plain language of section 211 (a). The statute precludes
them both.
B. Legislative History
The legislative history also suggests that Congress meant to preclude
review of allegedly ultra vires regulations. The 1924 statute made all
findings of fact by the Veterans' Director "conclusive," but it mentioned
nothing about questions of law.223 The language of the preclusion statute
in Economy Act of 1933 was broader, making all decisions "final and
conclusive on all questions of law and fact."' 4 According to the state-
ments made at the time of its passage, the addition of language concern-
ing questions of law was not significant. The 1933 statute was said
merely to restate the law as it had previously existed.' This suggests
that prior to 1933 review of decisions regarding questions of law was also
precluded, despite the omission of language to that effect in the 1924 law.
The 1933 statute is also the only one whose express language suggests
that review of regulations may be precluded. The phrase "[a]ll decisions
... under the provisions of this title, or the regulations issued pursuant
thereto, shall be final and conclusive"" 6 may be interpreted one of two
ways. First, it may be read to preclude review of decisions made under
either the Title or the regulations issued under the Title. Second, it may
be read to preclude review of decisions under the Title, and also to pre-
clude review of regulations issued under the Title. There is some evi-
dence to support the first view in the language of section 9 of the
Economy Act of 1933.27 That section stated that when a veteran's bene-
fits claim had finally been disallowed "under this title and the regulations
issued thereunder," the claim could not later be "reopened or al-
lowed."" 8 Both Sections were under the veterans' benefits title of the
Economy Act, suggesting that section 5 should not be read as expressly
precluding review of regulations, but rather that section 5, like section 9,
dealt solely with the decisions under the title or regulations issued pursu-
222. See Traynor v. Walters, 791 F.2d 226, 229 (2d Cir. 1986) ("The problem was
simply one of applying the statute, through regulation and factfinding, to Traynor's par-
ticular case."), cerL granted sub nor. Traynor v. Turnage, 55 U.S.L.W. 3607 (U.S. Mar.
10, 1987) (No. 86-622).
223. See supra notes 92, 93 and accompanying text.
224. Economy Act of 1933, ch. 3, § 5, 48 Stat. 8, 9 (current version at 38 U.S.C.
§ 211(a) (1982)). See supra notes 94, 96 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
226. Economy Act of 1933, ch. 3, § 5, 48 Stat. 8, 9 (current version at 38 U.S.C.
§ 211(a) (1982)).
227. Economy Act of 1933, ch. 3, § 9, 48 Stat. 8, 10, repealed by Veterans' Benefits Act
of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-56, § 2202(128), 71 Stat. 83, 167.
228. Id.
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ant to it. 229 At that time, however, Congress may have felt it unneces-
sary to include a phrase specifically barring review of regulations. The
1924, 1933 and 1940 laws clearly precluded review of individual benefits
claims.2 30 In that era, the doctrine of ripeness23  precluded review of
rules until they were applied in the course of an adjudication.232 Con-
gress likely thought that by passing these acts it was also precluding re-
view of regulations.
Like section 5 of the Economy Act, the 1940 preclusion statute was
said merely to continue the law already in effect.233 The 1940 statute,
however, was also to provide a uniform law for the preclusion of review
of all benefits claims.234 It had been the practice of Congress to provide
for the preclusion of review in each of the major benefits laws it had
passed. Thus, the 1924 and 1933 preclusion statutes had been passed as
part of major benefits packages.235 Since 1933, additional benefits legisla-
tion had been passed that had not included a preclusion statute.236 It is
possible that decisions concerning these benefits might have been subject
to review under the Warner-Logan Bill. 237 Thus, the 1940 statute was
229. This interpretation is supported by a statement made by Senator Harrison in the
Congressional Record. "The only purpose of [§ 5 of the Economy Act] is that after the
President has announced the regulations and fixed the rates the decision shall be final,
and that, acting under those regulations and rates, whatever decision the Administrator
shall make shall be final." 77 Cong. Rec. 254 (1933) (statement of Sen. Harrison).
230. See supra notes 8 & 92-99 and accompanying text.
231. In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), the Court defined ripe-
ness as a doctrine
prevent[ing] the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from en-
tangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and
also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative
decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the chal-
lenging parties. The problem is best seen in a twofold aspect, requiring [the
courts] to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the
hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.
Id. at 148-49.
232. See id. at 175-76 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (criticizing Court's permitting "a gross,
shotgun fashion" of review of regulations prior to any action attempting to enforce the
regulations as "gross, free-wheeling" and contrary to "established principles of jurispru-
dence, solidly rooted in the constitutional structure of our Government"). See generally,
Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 345, 375-77 (1979) (discussing changes in approach to ripeness since passage of
the A.P.A.).
233. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
234. See 86 Cong. Rec. 13,491 (1940) (statement of Rep. Rogers).
235. See World War Veterans' Act, 1924, ch. 320, 43 Stat. 607 (providing disability
treatment and payments, insurance, vocational rehabilitation); supra notes 94, 95 and
accompanying text.
236. See 86 Cong. Rec. 13,491 (1940) (statement of Rep. Rogers); see, e.g., Act of June
28, 1934, ch. 867, 48 Stat. 1281 (pensions for survivors of disabled veterans of World War
I and American intervention in post-revolutionary Russia); Act of August 25, 1937, ch.
759, 50 Stat. 786 (Indian War veterans' pensions); Act of May 24, 1938, ch. 268, 52 Stat.
440 (pension improvements to veterans of Spanish-American War, Philippine Insurrec-
tion and China Relief Expedition).
237. In 1940 Congress passed the Warner-Logan Bill, which would have subjected all
administrative agencies not exempted from its provisions to judicial review had it not
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passed to ensure that review of decisions concerning all benefits was
precluded.
There are passages in the legislative history of the 1940 statute that
reflect the then prevalent attitudes toward government benefits. It was
stated that VA benefits were gratuities, and as such, suits concerning such
benefits were barred unless Congress consented."3 Without a specific
provision, "consent to be sued does not exist."1 9 If Congress believed
that it had not consented to suit for gratuitous benefits,2" it probably
also believed that it had not consented to challenges to VA regulations,
particularly since regulations were not open to challenge except in the
context of benefits adjudications.2 '
The next important preclusion legislation was passed in 1970 amend-
ing the 1958 version of the statute.242 The Bill was expressly meant to
overrule the judicially created exception to section 211 (a) and restore the
traditional preclusion law.24 Congress included in its legislative history
a letter from the Administrator complaining that the exception had sub-
jected all aspects of VA policy, including regulations, to judicial re-
view.24 4 It also included in the legislative history a strong statement that
the amendment embodied congressional intent that any and all decisions
with respect to noncontractual benefits were to be unreviewable.245 This
been vetoed by President Roosevelt. See 1 K. Davis, supra note 11, § 1:7 at 23-24. This
was an era of great controversy about administrative law and judicial review. See gener-
ally 1 K. Davis, supra, § 1:7, at 20-24 (discussing controversy concerning administrative
law in the 1930's); Landis, Crucial Issues in Administrative Law, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1077
(1940) (discussing controversy concerning administrative law and Warner-Logan Bill).
The bill provided for a special procedure permitting review of administrative rules said to
be beyond the Agency's statutory authority. See 86 Cong. Rec. 13,745 (1940) (Senate
version of bill provision providing judicial review of rules, accepted by House at 86 Cong.
Rec. at 13,815-17 (1940)). Administrative rules were defined as including "regulations
... interpreting the terms of statutes they are respectively charged with administering."
86 Cong. Rec. 4650 (1940) (definition section of Bill). The VA was not exempt from the
Bill's provisions, see 86 Cong. Rec. 13,747 (1940) (Senate version of exemption provision,
adopted by House at 86 Cong. Rec. 13,807-17 (1940)), and the Veterans' Administrator
complained that it "would materially interfere with prompt and efficient administration
of benefits." Hearings on H.R. 4236, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 114 (1939), quoted in Landis,
supra, at 1087. The following year Congress passed a third preclusion statute. See supra
note 97 and accompanying text. Although there is no contemporary indication in the
legislative history that the statute was enacted as a result of the Warner-Logan Bill, a
1970 letter from the Administrator to Congress stated that the VA had proposed the 1940
statute to prevent it from falling under the provisions of the Warner-Logan Bill. H.R.
Rep. No. 1166, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
3723, 3740.
238. See 86 Cong. Rec. 13,491 (1940) (statement of Rep. Rogers).
239. Id.
240. See id.
241. See supra notes 231, 232 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
243. See H.R. Rep. No. 1166, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8-11, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 3723, 3729-3 1.
244. See id. at 3740.
245. "The restated section 21 l(a) will make it perfectly clear that the Congress intends
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presumably would include promulgation of regulations designed to deter-
mine eligibility for benefits, as the promulgation of regulations are deci-
sions of law under statutes providing benefits for veterans. Finally, the
method chosen by Congress in 1970 to amend section 211(a) has been
described as far broader than would be necessary if its only purpose had
been only to overrule the exceptions created by the District of Columbia
Circuit.246 Congress removed the language concerning "claims" from
the statute.247 Thus Congress clearly wanted to signal that more than
just the individual fact based adjudications were non-reviewable.
In sum, the legislative history provides some indication that Congress
has precluded review of agency action, including regulations alleged to be
ultra vires. The 1933 and 1940 statutes provided for preclusion of review
of questions of law and at the time these statutes were in effect regula-
tions could only be challenged through an attack on their use in an adju-
dication. Congress passed a preclusion statute to ensure that review of
all benefits determinations was precluded in the same year it passed a bill
permitting review of administrative agency regulations. At the time
these Bills were passed it was thought that review of actions concerning
gratuities was precluded unless Congress granted consent in such cases to
sue the United States. Finally, in 1970 when Congress amended the pre-
clusion statute to overrule exceptions created by the District of Columbia
Circuit and return the law of preclusion to its traditional scope, it did so
in a highly emphatic manner.
D. The Statute's Objectives, the Statutory Scheme, and the Type of
Administrative Action Involved
A search to determine if Congress intended to preclude judicial review
includes an analysis of the objectives of the statute.24 One of the pri-
mary objectives of section 211(a) is to keep the federal courts out of the
technical aspects of VA policy.2 49 Permitting review of allegedly ultra
vires regulations may interfere with this objective in two possible ways.
First, uniformity will be at risk if individual circuit and district courts
reach different conclusions concerning the requirements of the benefits
laws. 250 As the Supreme Court noted in Robison: "'It cannot be ex-
to exclude from judicial review all determinations with respect to noncontractual benefits
provided for veterans and their dependents and survivors." Id. at 3731.
246. See Falter v. VA, 502 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (D.N.J. 1980) ("Nevertheless, the lan-
guage that [Congress] chose to employ ... is far broader than that narrow purpose [of
overruling the D.C. Circuit] would require."); see supra notes 106-111 and accompanying
text.
247. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. The Veterans' Administrator had
proposed a bill that would have overruled the D.C. Circuit exception by statutorily defin-
ing the word "claim" to include the "assertion of rights to continuance, nonreduction, or
restoration of... benefits or payments .... " H.R. Rep. No. 1166, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 24,
reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News. 3723, 3743.
248. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
250. Compare McKelvey v. Turnage, 792 F.2d 194, 199-203 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (per
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pected that the decisions of the many courts would be based on the uni-
form application of principles as is now done by the Veterans'
Administration through its system of coordination.... ,,' The cur-
rent myriad of section 21 l(a) interpretations illustrates this problem. 2
Second, the promulgation of regulations controlling adjudications are at
least as likely as the adjudications themselves to involve "technical and
complex" policies concerning benefits. 253 A reviewing court must neces-
sarily "interpret" the regulations in question to determine if they are con-
sistent with the statute under which the regulations were promulgated. 2"
Because such regulations may involve highly technical and complex ar-
eas of VA policy and were conceived against the background of the VA's
considerable experience, it is almost inevitable that such an interpretation
will involve the courts in VA policy.
The final components of congressional intent are the structure of the
entire statutory scheme and the nature of the administrative action in-
volved.2" The Supreme Court noted in Robison that the types of issues
curiam) (VA alcoholism regulation declaring "primary alcoholism" to be willful miscon-
duct is lawful), cert. granted sub nor. Traynor v. Turnage, 55 U.S.L.W. 3607 (U.S. Mar.
10, 1987) (No. 86-737) with Tinch v. Walters, 573 F. Supp. 346, 348 (E.D. Tenn. 1983)
(mem.), aff'd, 765 F.2d 599, 601-03 (6th Cir. 1985) (VA alcoholism regulation declaring
"primary alcoholism" to be willful misconduct unlawful).
251. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 370 n.12 (1974) (quoting Hearing on H.R. 360
at 1963 (quoting the Administrator)).
252. See supra notes 9, 179-181 and accompanying text.
253. In Robison the Supreme Court quoted the Administrator. "'In the adjudication
of compensation and pension claims a wide variety of medical, legal and other technical
questions constantly arise which require the study of expert examiners of considerable
training and experience....'" Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 370 n.12 (1974) (quot-
ing the Administrator in Hearing on H.R. 360). Although the quote specifically refers to
adjudications themselves, its conclusion is equally applicable to regulations controlling
these adjudications since the adjudications are controlled by a "massive set of regula-
tions." See J. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State 265 (1985) (regulations
controlling VA adjudications); cf 38 C.F.R. parts 0-41 (1986) (regulations governing Vet-
erans' Administration). This observation was also made by Judge, now Justice, Scala in
his opinion in Gott v. Walters, 756 F.2d 902, 909-10 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, rehearing en
banc granted, 791 F.2d 172 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), remanded with instructions to dismiss
with prejudice, 791 F.2d 172 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (en bane). The case involved a
challenge by veterans, veterans' wives, and veterans' organizations to VA regulations con-
cerning claims of injury from radiation exposure. See Gott, 756 F.2d at 904. Judge Scalia
wrote a long opinion holding that § 211(a) precluded review of VA regulations. See Gott,
756 F.2d at 905-16. Following the grant of a rehearing en banc the case was settled,
remanded and dismissed. See Gott v. Walters, 791 F.2d 172 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (en bane).
The settlement agreement was published in the Federal Register. See Settlement Agree-
ment; Gott v. Walters, 50 Fed. Reg. 45,703 (1985). But see Merged Area X (Educ.) v.
Cleland, 604 F.2d 1075, 1078 (8th Cir. 1979) (same); University of Md. v. Cleland, 621
F.2d 98, 100 (4th Cir. 1980) (same); Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627, 631-32
(6th Cir. 1978) (review of regulations does not involve court in complex aspects of VA
policy).
254. Cf Evergreen State College v. Cleland, 621 F.2d 1002, 1009-11 (9th Cir. 1980)
(court interprets regulation defining full-time study to determine if it is consistent with
statute); Merged Area X (Educ.) v. Cleland, 604 F.2d 1075, 1078-81 (8th Cir. 1979)
(same); Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627, 632-34 (6th Cir. 1978) (same).
255. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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handled by the VA are of the sort that are ideal for administrative and
not judicial adjudication. 256 As a result, the VA benefits disbursement
system is one that does not operate under the adversary system of dispute
resolution found in the courts.25 7 Some commentators have questioned
whether the courts can be as effective in the area of government benefits
as can a strictly controlled bureaucracy. 258
The process that has developed instead of an adversarial system is one
that "operates informally and nonadversarially. ' '219 In addition to a gen-
eral denial of judicial review, the system also limits the fee a lawyer can
charge for any one veteran's claim to ten dollars, and provides criminal
penalties for exceeding this limit.2" One court has described this system
as one "plainly rejecting the judicialization, and even the lawyerization,
of this field."' 26 1 The system was designed to be informal and easily ac-
cessible and understandable to veterans, and to handle most efficiently
the large number of benefits claims.262 Permitting judicial review endan-
gers these aims. The courts will become involved in VA policy and may
formalize and proceduralize the system, raising the danger that the sys-
256. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 370 n.12 (1974) (quoting the Administrator
in Hearing on H.R. 360).
257. See Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 105 S. Ct. 3180, 3183
(1985).
258. See generally 5 K. Davis, supra note 11, § 28:14. Professor Davis notes that the
massive number of cases handled by bureaucracies such as the VA fall into patterns that
afford opportunity for greater efficiency than that attainable in the courts. A large
number of cases develop into categories that are susceptible to extensive study and ac-
cumulation of experience denied the courts. These factors also allow for the writing of
regulations that may provide "a brand ofjustice that is superior to what a reviewing court
could do by using customary judicial methods." Id. at 325. Finally, Professor Davis
notes that the tight control kept over bureaucrats will lead to less disturbing case by case
variations than that found among federal judges under no such controls. "Equal justice is
the loser when variations are wider." Id. at 326.
259. See Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 105 S. Ct. 3180, 3194 n.12
(1985). "The process is designed to function throughout with a high degree of informal-
ity and solicitude for the claimant." Id. at 3184. For a general description of the VA
claims process, see id. at 3184-85; Rabin, supra note 61, at 911-16.
260. See supra note 5. In addition to an attorney, whose fee is limited to $10 per claim,
a "service representative" may represent a claimant in the VA claims process, or a claim-
ant may appear pro se. See Rabin, supra note 61, at 914-15; Walters v. National Ass'n of
Radiation Survivors, 105 S. Ct. 3180, 3184 & n.4 (1985). The service representatives are
authorized by statute, 38 U.S.C. § 3402 (1982 & Supp. 1111985), and are provided free of
charge by authorized veterans' groups regardless of the veteran's affiliation. See Radia-
tion Survivors, 105 S. Ct. at 3184. The service representatives are trained professionals
and are considered an important part of the benefits scheme. See id. at 3184. Although
the service representatives are thought to provide a "high quality of representation," id.
at 3194 n.12 (quoting S. Rep. No. 466, 97 Cong., 2 Sess. 25, 49-50 (1982)), this system
has been criticized as failing veterans in highly complex cases. See id. 3185-86. For a
description of the service representative system, see Rabin, supra note 61, at 914-20.
261. Gott v. Walters, 756 F.2d 902, 916 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, 791
F.2d 172 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), remanded with instructions to dismiss with prejudice,
791 F.2d 172 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (per curiam).
262. See Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 105 S. Ct. 3180, 3183,
3191-92 (1985); J. Mashaw, supra note 253, at 265-66.
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tern might develop into one not contemplated by Congress, and one less
efficient and flexible as it once was. 263
CONCLUSION
The Wayne State line of cases has created an exception to section
211(a) that should not exist. The express language of the Statute as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court indicates that section 211(a) bars review of
actions arising under the Statute, or of the Administrator's actions, either
of which would include claims that such actions are ultra vires. The his-
tory of the Statute shows that review of ultra vires regulations was meant
to be precluded, and that this purpose was to be carried forward into the
modem version of the Statute. Permitting such review violates the pri-
mary purposes of the Statute and is not necessarily compatible with the
system created by Congress. These factors provide the clear and con-
vincing evidence necessary to preclude review of VA actions claimed to
be ultra vires.
There are proposals in Congress to amend section 211 (a) and to permit
some form of judicial review.2 Congress must decide whether the bene-
fits of permitting review265 outweigh its costs,266 which too often seem to
be ignored. The resources available to the veterans' benefits system is
263. Cf. 105 S. Ct. at 3191-92 (permitting attorneys into veterans benefits system will
complicate a system Congress wanted to keep simple). Judicial review would change
"[ihe climate in which we would have to do our work.... The adjudication officers of
the Veterans Administration would deny more claims and cause more problems for veter-
ans by being more formal and restrictive." Interview with Robert Lyagh, National Direc-
tor of Rehabilitation for the American Legion (printed in Moss, VA Judicial Review?,
A.B.A. Journal, Sept. 1, 1986, at 29); 5 K Davis, supra note 11, § 28:14 at 324-27 (dis-
cussing advantages in administrative law of regulated bureaucracies over the courts).
264. A bill to permit judicial review has passed the Senate in the last four Congresses.
See 31 Cong. Rec. S10,405-13 (daily ed. July 30, 1985) (99th Cong.); 129 Cong. Rec.
S8494-97 (daily ed. June 15, 1983) (98th Cong.); 128 Cong. Rec. S 11,422, S11,426 (daily
ed. Sept. 14, 1982) (97th Cong.); 125 Cong. Rec. 24,751-74 (1979) (96th Cong.). The
House has never passed the bill.
265. In addition to the correction of occasional errors even the best bureaucracy will
make, judicial review will legitimate the system in the eyes of many. See 5 K. Davis,
supra note 11, § 28:14, at 326 (critic of judicial review favors its retention because of its
"political legitimation of the system."); Daschle, Making the Veterans' Administration
Work for Veterans, 11 J. Legis. 1 (1984).
266. See supra note 263 and accompanying text. The exact extent of the costs of pro-
viding judicial review is controversial. See Rabin, supra note 61, at 916-23. The Supreme
Court in Robison, however, declared that one of the primary purposes of § 21 1(a) was to
ensure that veterans' claims do not burden the courts with expensive and time consuming
litigation. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 367 & n.11 (1974). The cost ofjudicial
review would vary with the extent of judicial review provided. See Rabin, supra, at 921.
An estimate prepared by the VA estimated that the 1979 Senate judicial review bill would
substantially increase the workload of the VA Office of General Counsel, would require
the appointment of eight additional district court and one additional circuit court judges
(with the resultant rise in administrative costs) and increase in benefits costs as the VA
would occasionally be required by the courts to provide benefits it had denied. See 125
Cong. Rec. 24,768-69 (1979).
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limited, particularly in this age of budget constraints.267 Providing judi-
cial review may become such an expensive undertaking as to require that
cuts be made in some other program providing benefits to veterans or
other social programs.2 68 Congress must ensure that the improvements
in the system gained by providing judicial review are great enough to
justify the costs, particularly if those costs are borne by the truly deserv-
ing. Congress should not create another layer of procedural protection
that reaches virtually the same results as the present system, at much
greater cost.
The granting of access to the courts is an American tradition,269 and it
is possible that some courts have created exceptions to section 211 (a) in
part because they find "truly incomprehensible.., the whole concept of
a system of administrative justice, even in a field of government benefits,
without general judicial supervision. ' 270 Congress, however, with its
more comprehensive fact finding ability,2 7 1 is best suited to set the proper
policy. It is because of this unique ability to sift facts and determine
267. Between March 1 and Sept. 30, 1986 the VA was forced to reduce benefits pay-
ments in order to meet its spending targets under the Graham-Rudman-Hollings bill. See
Veterans Administration Implementation of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985, 51 Fed. Reg. 9575 (March 19, 1986). The impact on the courts
might also be substantial. During the Summer of 1986 most federal judicial districts were
forced to postpone non-criminal trials during a two week period due to a funding
shortfall. See N.Y. Times, July 2, 1986, at AlO, col. 5 (following suspension of civil trials
for two weeks due to lack of funds, civil trials underway with assurance of future fund-
ing); N.Y. Times, June 17, 1986, at A16, col. 5 (lack of funds requires delay in civil
trials); N.Y. Times, June 13, 1986, at A14, col. 6 (same); Kaufman, Justice Unfunded is
Justice Undone, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1986 at IV 17, col. 2 (effect of proposed automatic
budget cuts across the board threaten ability of judiciary to function). See also Friendly,
"Some Kind of Hearing" 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267 (1975):
It should be realized that procedural requirements entail the expenditure of lim-
ited resources, that at some point the benefit to individuals from an additional
safeguard is substantially outweighed by the cost of providing such protection,
and that the expense of protecting those likely to be found undeserving will
probably come out of the pockets of the deserving.
Id. at 1276.
268. Cf. supra notes 266, 267 and accompanying text (discussing costs of judicial
review).
269. See interview with Professor Frederick Davis (printed in Moss, VA Judicial Re-
view?, A.B.A. Journal, Sept. 1, 1986 at 29) ("It's deeply rooted in the American psyche
that you should be able to go into the American courthouse.").
270. Gott v. Walters, 756 F.2d 902, 915 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, reh'g en banc granted,
791 F.2d 172 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), remanded with instructions to dismiss with preju-
dice, 791 F.2d 172 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (per curiam). See also 5 K. Davis, supra
note 11, § 28:14, at 323-24 (virtually the entire legal profession would instinctively sup-
port judicial review).
271. "When Congress makes findings on essentially factual issues [involving effective-
ness of various processes] those findings are ... entitled to a great deal of deference,
inasmuch as Congress is an institution better equipped to amass and evaluate the vast
amounts of data bearing on such an issue." Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survi-
vors, 105 S. Ct. 3180, 3194 n.12 (1985).
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policy that the debate over judicial review belongs before the Congress,
and not the courts.
Stephen Van Dolsen

